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Aims and Scope
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Aims and Scope
One of the most central questions in finance is how to evaluate assets. Valuation
methods provide guidance to investors when choosing which assets to include
in their portfolios, and in which proportions. They also allowmanagers to make
decisions about the sources and uses of funds in their firms.
The classical framework, to which we will refer as neoclassical finance, built
on the 50s, relies on strong assumptions about the rationality of the individuals
who populate the markets. These agents are able to use all available informa-
tion to make correct inferences, and update their beliefs according to Bayesian
updating rules. They make choices that maximize their intertemporal utility.
They trade in markets which are competitive, complete, and liquid. It is in this
setup that the main theorems of asset pricing are obtained, in which only sys-
tematic, non-diversifiable risk is priced. Holding a riskier asset should bring
comparatively higher returns, which is the equivalent of saying there are “no
free lunches”, or alternatively, that the only way to achieve returns is to accept
some degree of risk.
This view of finance has provided easily actionable models that are well-
functioning, and present the advantage of being firmly grounded in theory. An
essential part of their attractiveness resides in the fact that they are obtained,
through deduction, from axioms that have normative appeal. However, it is un-
deniable that the predictions formulated in these models do not always match
the actual behavior observed in financial markets.
What are some of those elements that collide with the beautiful picture of
agents and markets envisioned in neoclassical finance?
To begin with, there is too much trading volume around. In the standard
models, agents should trade very little between themselves, to the point that
some authors have proposed what are referred to as “no trade theorems” (Mil-
grom and Stokey, 1982). Observed levels of volatility are also too high compared
to theoretical expectations, as pointed out in Shiller (1981). The Equity Premium
Puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) shows that the return differential between
equities and bonds cannot be explained by risk alone.
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Of particular interest to us in this thesis are two areas in which empirical ob-
servations prove difficult to reconcile with theoretical predictions: the difficulty
to describe the risk and return relationship in the standard framework, and the
apparent lack of risk exposure found in the stock returns of multinationals.
Such results, termed anomalies, are not consistent with the established asset-
pricing theories. Indeed, a result is only anomalous in relative terms to a model
that describes the expected result. In the first two empirical investigations, we
will show how certain risk-sorted portfolios, in particular market states, display
patterns that are not compatible with standard asset pricing results.
Our contribution revolves around two main components.
First, our focus will be on the notion of disagreement, by which we desig-
nate the dispersion of beliefs, or the divergence of opinions, among investors,
concerning the value of an asset. This concept has been the topic of promising
empirical investigations, but in the context of stock returns, disagreement ismost
oftenmeasured at the stock-level (Diether et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2002; Sadka and
Scherbina, 2007; Bali et al., 2016). We hypothesize that it is relevant to consider
disagreement also as an indicator of the market-wide investor mood, in a man-
ner reminiscent of the notion of sentiment. There have been a large number of
studies which consider the impact of optimistic vs. pessimistic periods on the
risk-return relationship (Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005; Baker and Wurgler, 2006;
Stambaugh et al., 2012; Antoniou et al., 2016), and which bring attention to the
fact that such mood swings can impact market dynamics. Surprisingly, there is
a lack of empirical investigations which consider disagreement in a similar man-
ner 1. It is more widespread in macroeconomics, where disagreement (and its
possible link with uncertainty) is considered in the context of inflation forecasts
and exchange rate markets, but so far, less so in the context of stock returns. We
will leveragemarket-widemeasures of disagreement in all three of our empirical
works: in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 where we will consider its impact jointly with
sentiment, and in Chapter 4 in the context of the risk exposure of multinationals.
Second,wewill take an interest in recent developments to extend the classical,
one-factor CAPM, and see what insight can be gained from the decomposition
of returns framework of Campbell and Shiller (1988b,a). The intuition is that
the value of a stock portfolio can vary because of news related to future cash
flows, and also because of news related to the discount rates that will be applied
to discount those cash flows. The choice of the methodology used in empirical
contexts relies to some extent on the degree of predictability of stock returns,
1 Notable exceptions include Hong and Stein (2007); Hong and Sraer (2016).
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and is thus influenced by the ongoing debate in this area2. In Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004), the authors extend this decomposition of the market return
in two components to the CAPM, and show that its beta can also be decomposed
in a cash flowbeta and a discount rate beta. Using a Vector Autoregression (VAR)
approach, as in Campbell (1991), to operationalize the decomposition of returns,
they are able to shed new light on an empirical puzzle that had been a thorn in
the side of finance practitioners since Fama and French (1992): small stocks and
value stocks seem to display patterns in their returns that are not related to their
beta. They argue that the higher returns for value stocks and small stocks3 can
be explained by higher loadings on cash flow beta, which carries a higher price
of risk4.
We propose to leverage the additional insights brought by the decomposi-
tion of returns framework, in conjunction with market-wide measures of dis-
agreement and sentiment, to gain a better understanding of the relationship be-
tween risk and return. Given that they do not seem to agree with standard asset-
pricing frameworks, our results indicate either that these frameworks are not
able to appropriately represent reality. In that respect, such findings might en-
tice searchers to refinemodels to incorporate elements that are suspected of being
significant, and so far comparatively neglected. They could also indicate market
inefficiencies, which, under the condition that they are economically significant
enough, could be exploited by arbitrageurs. However, as Schwert (2003) points
out, anomalies have a tendency to disappear, either because they have been arbi-
traged away, but also possibly because their detection was dependent on a spe-
cific period being investigated. Evenmore simply, their appearancemight be due
to purely random factors. While we strive to address these concerns to the best of
our abilities, their invitation to some level of prudence in possible extrapolations
is duly heard.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1, we propose to provide a
survey centered around the concept of disagreement, which plays an important
role in the rest of our empirical essays. We aim to provide an overview of where
our understanding of the notion of disagreement fits in the existing literature of
behavioral finance, putting the emphasis on its essential features. An important
issuewe then discuss is how tomeasure disagreement. We then consider existing
results on the relationship between disagreement and stock returns, both on the
theoretical side and on the empirical side, before ending the chapter with some
thoughts on the link between disagreement, sentiment, and uncertainty.
2 On that topic, a recent excellent summary is provided in Cochrane (2011).
3 As in Fama and French (1992).
4 A result obtained by extending the ICAPMmodel of Merton (1973).
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Of capital interest in our first two empirical investigations is the relationship
between risk and return. In the neoclassical framework, this relationship is de-
scribed using the Capital Asset PricingModel (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lint-
ner (1965), wherein only one factor, the beta of an asset with the market portfo-
lio, should summarize a stock’s risk. This simple relationship has proven most
elusive in empirical works: other factors than beta have proven to matter in ex-
plaining the cross-section of stock returns (Banz, 1981; Basu, 1977, 1983; Fama
and French, 1992). Additionally, higher beta stocks have proven that they do
not deliver higher returns than lower beta stocks (Baker et al., 2011; Frazzini and
Pedersen, 2014).
In Chapter 2, with a sample of 2,085 firms, we investigate how disagreement
interacts with the decomposition of returns framework, in the context of the in-
vestigation of the risk return relationship. We build our measure of disagree-
ment on the basis of analysts’ forecasts, a choice that is extensively motivated by
the literature (Fried and Givoly, 1982; O’brien, 1988; Abarbanell et al., 1995). We
build a market-wide measure of disagreement, in a spirit similar to Yu (2011);
Hong and Sraer (2016). We follow the decomposition of returns using a VAR
methodology, following Campbell (1991); Campbell and Mei (1993); Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004), and leveraging some recent developments such as Chen
and Zhao (2009); Chen et al. (2013) concerning the choice of variables to include
in the state vector. Given that, in a large portion of the existing literature on
disagreement, authors have used stock-level dispersion of forecasts, we also in-
vestigate to which extent our results would compare to that approach.
A legitimate concern for results obtained with a disagreement measure, in a
literature dominated by empirical investigations about the effect of investor sen-
timent, is whether the results obtained are possibly a manifestation of that other,
more well-known, and better documented factor. In Chapter 3, we propose to
address that concern, and we consider in conjunction the impact of sentiment
and disagreement, using for the former the time series proposed by Baker and
Wurgler (2006). An analysis of risk premia in differentmarket states also follows.
In Chapter 4, we consider risk and return in another context, that of firms’ ex-
posure to risk factors, and in this case, the exposure of US multinationals to for-
eign exchange risk. There are well-documented reasons to lead us to expect that
investors should incorporate in their valuation models the impact of exchange
risk on firms: Shapiro (1975) is among the first and most influential, followed
by Dumas (1978); Hodder (1982), but also Flood Jr and Lessard (1986); Hekman
(1985), and, from a microeconomic point of view Levi (1994) and Bodnar et al.
(2002). What is surprising is that this exposure is hard to find in the data, for
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instance in the works of Jorion (1990); He andNg (1998); Griffin and Stulz (2001),
who find at best mixed results in that regard. Adler and Dumas (1984) empha-
size that unanticipated foreign exchange movements should have an impact of
firm value. To build a measure of anticipation, researchers often rely on experts’
forecasts. The hypothesis we put to the test in this chapter is whether the in-
formation content of these forecasts is dependent on the disagreement among
experts who formulated it. In a way, our approach propose an articulation in the
foreign exchange exposure literature of ideas from other works which consider
how the quality and precision of information received by investors can influence
stock returns, as in Veronesi (2000) or Zhang (2006).
Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of this thesis and presents some
possibilities for future research.
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Part II
Context
9

Chapter 1
A survey on behavioral finance and
disagreement
1.1 Preliminary notes
Our aim in this section is to position some key concepts in the existing literature,
starting from a view as broad as possible, and progressively delving in greater
detail. Doing so will enable, we hope, the readers to better understand on which
level we follow the classical framework of empirical finance, on which level we
stray apart, and the extent to which our approach follows or departs from previ-
ous investigations.
In the rest of this chapter, after a few words on neoclassical finance and its
main assumptions, we propose in Section 1.2 a quick overview of the role of
anomalies in finance, followed by a brief discussion of the contribution of behav-
ioral finance in that area. Then, in Section 1.3, we will focus in greater detail on
the concepts of sentiment and particularly disagreement in the context of behav-
ioral finance. Finally, in Section 1.3.5 we will share a few thoughts on sentiment.
1.2 Neoclassical finance and anomalies
1.2.1 Neoclassical finance
The traditional framework in which practitioners have sought to understand fi-
nancial markets, and which is sometimes referred to as "neoclassical finance",
has had its main foundation laid out the 50s and the 60s. It is built on the fol-
lowing assumptions. First of all, the representative agents in financial markets
can be understood as rational, homogeneous individuals, who make correct in-
ferences based on the information they receive, and act upon them in a way that
11
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is consistent with intertemporal utility maximization notions. Additionally, it is
generally assumed that there are no arbitrage opportunities available.
There are many advantages to the conceptual simplicity of this approach. It
allows the building of a formal architecture which, in turn, allows the derivation
of formal theorems. The first of two of the most important is the Fundamen-
tal Theorem of Asset Pricing, which maintains that the following assertions are
equivalent : absence of arbitrage, existence of a consistent positive linear pricing
rule, and existence of an optimum for an agent who prefers more to less. The
other is the Pricing Rule Representation Theorem, which posits that the positive
linear pricing rule mentioned above can be formulated using state prices, risk-
neutral expectations, or state-price density.
The analysis of standard portfolio choice problems1 obtains classical results,
which are still influential and widely used among finance practitioners, such as
optimal portfolio choice models, and asset pricing models, chiefly the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT).
1.2.2 Anomalies
Empirical investigations of the markets sometimes deliver findings that do not
agree with the expectations of the established models. These "anomalies" might
indicate either that the underlying models need to be modified to better reflect
reality, but theymight also point tomarket inefficiencies, whichwould contradict
the EfficientMarketHypothesis (EMH), but not necessarilymean that themodels
need revising. Fama (1970), points out that tests of market efficiency actually
always perform a joint test on the underlying models.
Documented anomalies tend to disappear after they have been documented
in the literature. The question that arises is whether this is due to the fact that
the anomaly, while real, has been exploited by smart investors and arbitraged
away from the market, or alternatively, that there was not much of an anomaly
to begin with, maybe because its detection was a statistical aberration2.
Several of these anomalies are as follows:
The trading volume that can be observed is much too high to be explained in
a model in which agents are rational, and should in theory trade very little. Even
accounting for liquidity or rebalancing needs does not allow for the rationaliza-
1 In which, to sum up briefly, we want to derive portfolio holdings and consumptions, to maxi-
mize utility of consumption, under the budget constraint.
2 Campbell et al. (1997) describe what they term data snooping, the fact that with so many re-
searches incentivized to find anomalous patterns in data, standard statistical methods to es-
tablish significance do not provide accurate results, and propose methods to correct for the
over-reporting of statistically significant findings.
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tion the immense trading volumes observed. Another, often related matter, is
that of volatility, that is to say that prices of financial assets are more volatile
than what we should expect in the classical, rational and efficient world.
There are predictable differences in returns across assets: Banz (1981) doc-
ument, for instance, that small-capitalization firms earn higher average returns
that what is predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe
(1964); Lintner (1965). Basu (1977) finds that value firms, i.e., firms with high
earnings-to-price ratios, also earn returns that are not consistent with CAPM ex-
pectations. Similarly, Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that value strategies, which
consist of buying stocks that have low prices relative to accounting measures
outperform the market. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that there is somemo-
mentum in stock returns, and that past winners outperform past losers on an
annual basis.
In the cross-section of stock returns, the CAPM tells us that no other factor
than an asset’s beta should be able to explain its returns. Many deviations from
this have been extensively documented through the years, with Fama and French
(1992) among themost well-known, in which both size and and a scaled-price ra-
tio, book-to-market, are found to create patterns in the cross-section of stock re-
turns. Fama and French (1993) incorporate these anomalies into the asset-pricing
model. The standard CAPM beta itself does not deliver the expected results
when considering the security market line, which depicts the relationship be-
tween risk and returns, with riskier stocks failing to deliver higher returns in a
series of results starting with Black (1972) and Black et al. (1972).
Thus, while the traditional framework has provided results that form the
foundations of finance, there does seem to be sufficient concerns to warrant in-
vestigating deviations from its main assumptions.
Behavioral finance
Behavioral finance can be understood as an attempt to incorporate biases and
limitations, identified in social psychology into asset-pricing theories, by relax-
ing the rationality of agents. We can distinguish two main avenues of investiga-
tion, that form the two pillars of behavioral finance: firstly, the aforementioned
limitation of the rationality of investors, through psychological factors, and sec-
ondly, the consideration of possible limits to arbitrage3.
There are twoways for an investor’s psychology to exert an influence that leads
to a behavior that would be considered irrational in the classical framework.
3 Some designs incorporate either one of these aspects, others the two in conjunction.
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The first crucial component is how agents form expectations based on infor-
mation, or beliefs. Psychologists have identified several biases in the belief for-
mation process : overconfidence, the fact that people overestimate the precision
of their estimates, overoptimism (or wishful thinking), or anchoring, to cite but
a few.
Alternatively, even if we assume that investors update their beliefs in effi-
cient and unbiased ways, they might act upon them with decision rules that do
not conform to the standard expected utility framework, with von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences. One of the most famous deviation from the standard
preferences is the one proposed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They con-
sider a form of weighted utility in which people have differential preferences to
monetary gains than losses, displaying a disproportionately large aversion for
the latter.
The second pillar of behavioral finance rests on limits to arbitrage, that is to say,
the hurdles met by agents to exploit arbitrage opportunities in markets. Indeed,
in a world composed at least partly by investors with psychological biases, and
who henceforth provide price signals that deviate from what rationality would
dictate to be fundamental values, how come other, smart arbitrageurs would not
be able to exploit this mispricing and bring the price back to sanity?
Researchers have identified mechanisms that would prevent such arbitrage
opportunities to be taken advantage of. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show how
risky and prohibitively costly it can be to try to exploit a mispricing. Restrictions
on the capacity of investors to adopt short positions are one of the main ways
throughwhich limits to arbitrage aremanifest, be it, for instance, regulatory con-
siderations for mutual funds, or psychological considerations for individuals, as
in Barber and Odean (2008).
1.3 Disagreement and sentiment
One issue with the term disagreement is that it can tend to mean quite different
things to different people, which can create a non-negligible risk of confusion.
Quite simply, in accordance with most of the literature, we define disagree-
ment as the fact that some investors hold a different opinion regarding the value
of a financial asset4.
In the framework of classical finance, there is little room for any notion of
disagreement. Consider a conservative interpretation: market activity generates
4 In some papers, the concept is referred to as "difference of opinion", "divergence of opinions",
with very similar or identical interpretations.
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information, which is delivered simultaneously to all market participants. Those
participants are thought to be rational agents (or at least, that the representative
participant can be construed as a rational agent) who use the same model to in-
terpret the received information. They in turn form identical beliefs, uponwhich
they act according to standard preferences.
Those investors are thus considered to correctly, and identically, evaluate fi-
nancial assets. Consequently, as mentioned above, this has led some researchers,
as inMilgrom and Stokey (1982), to develop theoretical models based on rational
expectations in which all the information available in the market is communi-
cated through price changes, and consequently, when an equilibrium is reached,
no trade should ever occur, even when agents receive private information, a re-
sult which is known as the "no-trade theorem". Other related models can be
found in Rubinstein (1975) and Hakansson et al. (1982).
Such a result was of course meant as a way to underline the interest that lied
in the development of models which are able to account for the inescapable fact
that investors do trade, and in high volumes (at the very least, with respect to
the prediction that a "no-trade" theorem delivers). Such developments have been
made in Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995),
but their models put the emphasis on trying to generate volume patterns, which
do not necessarily have a significant impact on prices.
1.3.1 Sources of disagreement
That there is some level of disagreement amongmarket participants is, on a prac-
tical manner, subject to little to no debate, be it because of the observed volumes
of trade, of because of general intuition and anecdotal observation of financial
markets.
What are the processes throughwhich disagreementmight arise amongmar-
ket participants? A first possibility lies in the way information is transmitted to
them. News might indeed not arrive simultaneously for all market participants.
This can be due to a number of reasons, for instance, information might be costly
to acquire5, or alternatively, some investors might just pay more attention to spe-
cific news than others, for instance professional traders specialized in a specific
industry. This concept has been used in Hong and Stein (1999) to show how
a model with gradual information flow could explain the momentum effect. A
very close conceptual approach is that of limited attention in investors, which put
more emphasis on the limited cognitive abilities of the representative investor to
5 As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) among others.
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correctly incorporate all available information in her decisions, see for instance
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) in which attention is drawn to the form of the in-
formation presented to the investor, or Peng and Xiong (2006) who show that
investors tend to process more market and sector-wide information than firm-
specific information.
Intuitively, it is easy to see how the concept of limited attention can create dis-
agreement among market participants, who simply do not share the same signal
on which to form their beliefs. However, a question is then raised : when real-
izing that a number of market participants appear to possess better information,
and after observing the trades on the markets, how come other investors do not
update their beliefs accordingly?
To answer that question, apart from pointing to the fact that an investor who
is already cognitively overloaded to such an extent that she cannot process all
publicly available information can hardly be expected to leverage the informa-
tion available in trading activity6, one interesting notion is that of overconfidence.
Without overconfidence, rational investors should learn from each other’s trades,
even if they have different information sets, or to put it as John D. Geanakoplos7,
"We can’t disagree forever". Overconfidence means that investors overestimate
the precision of their own estimations and underestimate the information con-
tent available to them on the market. They in essence, neglect that they are pos-
sibly in the situation of informational disadvantage encompassed hereinabove89.
It thus could be that all information does not arrive simultaneously, or that
agents do not pay equal attention to all available information. Another possi-
bility might also be, that even if the information set is shared among market
participants, they differ in their inference-making processes because they do not
share, for instance, the same economic models to interpret that information. In
Kurz (1994), the author builds a model in which agents do not have structural
knowledge of the market, and develop individual beliefs with the same access
to data. Far from reducing disagreement, as is sometimes proposed, investors,
once confronted with new and identical information can still end up disagreeing
even more than before, as has been shown in Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kan-
del and Pearson (1995), if they have different models that lead them to different
interpretations.
Finally, even if agents would form the same beliefs on the basis of the mar-
6 A justification that in a sense would bring us back to the concept of limited attention again.
7 Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982).
8 The interlinking between overconfidence and limits to learning is put forward in Peng and
Xiong (2006).
9 On the psychological foundations of overconfidence, we refer to the classical works in Tversky
and Kahneman (1975).
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ket information they receive, they might act upon those in different ways. As
mentioned above, deviations from von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences of
rational choice. Some traders might also be characterized as risk-loving, as for
instance envisioned by Tirole (1982).
The growing literature on heterogeneous agents models (HAM), of which an
extensive review can be found in Hommes (2006), provides another example of
agents with different decision-making processes. A typical setup involves some
proportion of traders who trade on the fundamental value of financial assets,
with noise traders, who trade on short-term patterns. A classical example is De
Long et al. (1990).
Finally, even in the traditional portfolio optimization setup, differential initial
endowments, coupled with diversification motives, may induce different levels
of desirability across market participants for the same asset.
1.3.2 Measures of disagreement
Even though models have been built that incorporate the key features that we
want the notion of disagreement to possess, it still leaves open the question as to
how, in an empirical finance framework, one should try tomeasure disagreement.
Models are often silent as to which measurable features of individual investor
behavior or aggregate market features should be considered to capture the effect
of disagreement.
Ideally, what we would like to have is an estimate of the probability distribu-
tion for each individual investor. In a theoretical framework, conceptual tools of
information theory could then be used to consider disagreement. This possibil-
ity is raised by Zanardo (2016) to apply tools developed to measure the distance
between two probability distributions, such as the Kullback- Leibler divergence10
and the Bhattacharyya distance11 on the study of disagreement.
Such a theoretical approach does not provide any guidance for our choice
of an empirical proxy for disagreement, as the sort of information about beliefs
that would be required to leverage this methodology is not easily available to the
researcher, neither in a survey framework nor in an experimental context, which
we will not discuss here.
What we do have, however, is a subset of investors, whose work precisely in-
volves communicating to the public information about theirmarket expectations:
professional analysts. Given that there is a wide range of analysts who provide
forecasts, about stock market relevant data such as earnings, or foreign exchange
10 Kullback and Leibler (1951).
11 Bhattacharyya (1946).
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markets, one could use this set of forecasts as a proxy for the unobservable dis-
tribution of beliefs among all investors.
Assessing the appropriateness of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for disagree-
ment is not a straightforward task, as we do not really have a true, ex-post mea-
sure of disagreement with which we could compare our proxy. Answering that
question involves making assumptions as to which other measure you were aim-
ing for to begin with.
That being said, there have been attempts to objectify the relevance of the use
of forecasts in that context. Fried and Givoly (1982) compare the performance
of analysts’ forecasts to time series models to forecast earnings, and find the for-
mer more accurate. O’brien (1988) reaches the same conclusion in a very similar
endeavour. Abarbanell et al. (1995) consider the reactions to earnings surprises,
and find analysts’ forecasts satisfactory, if not perfect, proxy for investor beliefs.
Researchers have rightfully brought the attention on several limitations that
should be kept in mind when using analysts’ forecasts in the context of stock
markets. They are prone to several biases, mainly overoptimism, as pointed out
in Hong et al. (2000), Lim (2001) and Jackson (2005). Note at this stage that bi-
ases in the level of the forecast are a much lesser concern when it is a notion of
dispersion of forecasts that is of interest to the researcher.
1.3.3 Disagreement and Uncertainty
At this stage we take the opportunity to discuss the notion of uncertainty, and
how it interfaces with disagreement. In most conceptions, uncertainty is a con-
cept in a close semantical neighbourhood of disagreement, with often the inter-
pretation that establishing the presence of disagreement can be used to infer that
there is some uncertainty around, as we shall discuss in greater detail when dis-
cussing disagreement measures. Given the close proximity of the concepts, and
the fact that the related words are sometimes used in the literature in a manner
that does not allow the reader to easily distinguish the topic at hand, we propose
the following clarification.
The conventional definition of uncertainty traces back to Knight (1921), in
which a distinction between risk and uncertainty is proposed. Risk occurs when
the future is not known, but the probability distribution of the possible futures
is known. The classical comparison is that of a casino, in which the players know
the odds of the game. Uncertainty occurs when the probability distribution is not
known. Further complication, and the beginning of a link with disagreement,
arises when one considers that in this case, different investors might hold dif-
ferent estimates of that unknown probability distribution. Sometimes, the word
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ambiguity is helpfully used to refer to situations of uncertainty, such as in Heath
and Tversky (1991), a practice that unfortunately does not seem to have caught
on.
Motivations to take an interest on the concept of uncertainty abound in many
fields, not only in asset pricing, where awidely accepted result posits that people
have a stronger dislike for uncertainty than they do for risk12, but also in the study
of foreign exchange markets, or in macroeconomics.
In a way, disagreement and uncertainty are two concepts which are not nec-
essarily linked, and which empirical researchers would like to investigate. Both
lack a direct measurement method, and accordingly, both tend to rely on prox-
ies. The dispersion of analysts forecasts is an promising proxy for both concepts,
which can lead to some difficulty whent it comes to interpreting findings where
the dispersion of forecasts was used a proxy. Differentmodels, however, are built
to leverage the information that lies in uncertainty and disagreement, and these
models lead to different testable hypotheses.
A wide array of papers have, consequently, taken interest in whether dis-
agreement is, or not, an appropriate proxy for uncertainty. This is facilitated by
the fact that it is comparatively somewhat easier to build alternative measures
for uncertainty with which to compare the estimate based on disagreement, for
instance using a time series approach, or in the case of financial markets, implied
volatility indices.
Among the first to conclude that disagreement might be a relevant proxy for
uncertainty is Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), in the context of inflation fore-
casts. On the other side of that argument, we find Bomberger (1996), who point
out that while the mean expectation of forecasters can be taken as a proxy for the
representative agent’s mean expectation, there is no theoretical grounding, and
therefore it is more controversial, to assume that the variance across forecasts could
be used as a proxy for uncertainty, which they define as the conditional variance
of inflation about a particular forecast, that is to say, a measure of how far off
that forecast turned out to be. Another investigation on the role of disagreement
about future inflation is proposed by Mankiw et al. (2003). In Rich and Tracy
(2010), little evidence is found for a link between dispersion of inflation forecasts,
taken as a proxy for disagreement, and uncertainty.
This debate in macroeconomics is spilling into the accounting and empirical
finance literature, as for instance in Barron and Stuerke (1998) and Abarbanell
et al. (1995), where the authors try to investigate towhich extent dispersion in an-
alysts’ forecasts reflects uncertainty. Lahiri and Sheng (2010) use a standard de-
12 Barberis and Thaler (2003).
19
Chapter 1. Survey
composition of forecast errors into common and idiosyncratic shocks. They find
that the difference between uncertainty and disagreement is the perceived vari-
ance of future aggregate shocks that accumulate over forecast horizons, which
implies that the robustness of the relationship between uncertainty and disagree-
ment depends on the variance of aggregate shocks over time. In periods with
large volatility of aggregate shocks, disagreement is less useful as a proxy for
uncertainty.
Anderson et al. (2009) are interested in building an asset pricing model that
includes two risk factors, one featuring risk, the other uncertainty. They mea-
sure uncertainty using the disagreement of among analysts in the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters. They describe conditions under which they can guarantee
that uncertainty is proportional to disagreement, but point out that in reality, the
beliefs of forecasters may be influenced by new information in different ways.
Buraschi et al. (2014a) study the impact of heterogeneous perceptions among
agents on bond and stock returns. They build an aggregate disagreement risk
factor using factor-mimicking portfolios, and find that it is priced in the cross
section of bond and stock returns. Buraschi et al. (2014b) use a similar methodol-
ogy to investigate the cross-section of option returns. In these papers the interest
is in finding whether disagreement risk matters in asset pricing.
A recent work is Ter Ellen et al. (2016), where the authors compare disagree-
ment, measured as the dispersion in forecasts among expert dealers on foreign
exchange markets, and find that disagreement is best understood as a proxy for
heterogeneity rather than for uncertainty, as the latter relationship does not prove
stable through time, a finding that is consistent with Lahiri and Sheng (2010).
Persistence of disagreement
Even if we consider a market in which some subset of the investors hold biased
beliefs, in the sense that they do not conform to rational expectations, what pre-
vents some other part of investors, who hold a correct, unbiased, estimation of
the fundamental value of a financial asset, from exploiting this arbitrage oppor-
tunity, and in so doing, correct themispricing? Indeed, apart from detailing how
some level of disagreement can appear on the market, one needs also to consider
how this disagreement can persist and exert an influence on prices.
One factor that we already mentioned is that of limited learning, mechanisms
which explainwhy agents are not leveraging all the information available to them
in trades. Another possibility is to consider limits to arbitrage.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that exploiting arbitrage opportunities is not
a riskless affair, and that there are circumstances in which arbitrage strategies
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prove ineffective. It may be, for instance, that before the price gets back to a
level closer to its fundamental value, the mispricing widens : if some portion of
investors havemanaged to influence the price, nothing, in the short run, prevents
them from pushing the price even further from its fundamental value, and thus
force the tentative arbitrageur to suffer a loss, which hemight not be able to cover,
exiting the market, and worsening the mispricing13.
In the disagreement literature, limits to arbitrage are often envisioned through
the lens of short-selling constraints. These are motivated by the fact that some
proportion of market participants do no short as much as they should, whether
because they are prevented from doing so, as is the case for mutual funds (and
documented in Almazan et al. (2004)), or because, in the case of individuals, they
tend to only consider selling the stocks that they own, as shown in Barber and
Odean (2008). Lamont and Stein (2004) demonstrate that, at the market level,
aggregate short positions are too low and do not play a stabilizing role.
One particularly influential reference is Miller (1977), in which a model of
a market with some degree of divergence of opinion14 is developed, resulting
in more optimistic and more pessimistic investors, coupled with short-selling
constraints. In this model, under such circumstances, when disagreement rises,
pessimists are progressively crowded out of the market, given that they are pre-
vented from transmitting their signal to the market due to their inability to take
short positions. Under disagreement, this logic would lead us to expect some
level of overpricing.
Miller (1977) considers a one-period setting. Harrison and Kreps (1978) de-
velop a related model of speculative behavior with divergence of opinions, but
this time in a multi-period model.
1.3.4 The impact of disagreement on stock returns
Armed with a good candidate for a proxy of investors’ disagreement, there has
been interest in confronting theoretical models about the nature of the relation-
ship between disagreement and stock returns with stock market data15.
13 Essentially the argument in De Long et al. (1990).
14 Which, the author already mentions in this comparatively early paper, might be the result of
asymmetrical information.
15 We emphasize again that empirical approaches suffer from the fact that there subsists a level
of debate about the choice of the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts as a proxy. Arguments can be
raised concerning the exact nature of the effects captured by thismeasure, andwhether it prox-
ies for uncertainty or not. Similarly, one can object that the effects are merely the manifestation
of some other variable, that was not included in the model. In most settings, for instance, dis-
agreement occurs via asymmetrical information among investors and limits to arbitrage. The
effect of these two factors then becomes, in a way, mingled in the proxy for disagreement. Ac-
cordingly, one should be careful either to address this possible concern in her empirical design,
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Both on the theoretical and empirical side, the literature appears indecisive
as to the effect of disagreement: does it drive prices up, and returns down, or
vice versa?
Theoretical models that lead to an expected positive relationship between re-
turns and disagreement have been proposed by Varian (1989), who finds that the
asset with the more dispersion of beliefs, i.e., subject to the most disagreement,
will have the lower equilibrium price, in a market where all agents have iden-
tical tastes. Abel and Others (1989) find that increased heterogeneity in beliefs
reduces the stock price.
In an early investigation, Cragg and Malkiel (1968) and Malkiel and Cragg
(1970) had already gathered some support for the hypothesis that high disagree-
ment brings higher returns, as does Harris (1986). This also finds support in the
more recent work of Boehme et al. (2009) and Avramov et al. (2009), and also in
Carlin et al. (2014), even though in that last case, they investigate specifically the
market for mortgage-backed securities, and use as an empirical proxy for dis-
agreement the prepayment speed of mortgages.
Arguments for expecting a negative relationship between disagreement and
returns owe a lot to the model of Miller (1977) in which, when disagreement
arises, optimists dominate the market while pessimists are left out, and prices
tend to be overevaluated. Putting the accent on the speculative impulse, the
model has been extended in a multiple periods setting by Harrison and Kreps
(1978), in which agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation, and in a sim-
ilar argumentation, in Morris (1996), in which investors anticipate being able to
resell to another, even more optimistic investor, before learning takes place, and
hinders the progress of the speculative process at hand. Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003), still in that lineage, develop a model in which overconfidence and short-
sale constraints lead to asset price bubbles characterized by high trading volume
and high price volatility.
Empirical support for the Miller (1977) hypothesis has been extensive. Di-
ether et al. (2002) find that stocks for which the stock-level dispersion of EPS fore-
casts is higher underperform other stocks. Chen et al. (2002) consider a similar
environment of dispersion of beliefs and short-sale constraints, with the particu-
larity that they use the breadth of ownership, ameasure of the proportion of long
position for a particular asset, to proxy for the severity of short-sale constraints,
and find that tighter constraints are associated with lower returns. Goetzmann
and Massa (2005) find that dispersion of opinion is negatively related to future
returns, Park (2005) find that it has predictive power for lower returns at interme-
or keep in mind the that the reach of their conclusions might be limited.
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diate horizons, Hong et al. (2006) build a model in which heterogeneous beliefs
and limited float combine to create speculative bubbles. Finally, Bali et al. (2016)
propose a model in which idiosyncratic shocks to a stock’s volatility due to un-
usual news flow increase the level of disagreement about the firm value, and are
associated to lower returns.
Finally, Doukas et al. (2006) advocate, in a way, for a middle ground between
the two camps, and say that the impact of disagreement on stock returns is ac-
tually dependent on the sign of the forecast: in their results, overpricing occurs
when the forecasts are positive, but the reverse is true when forecasts are nega-
tive.
1.3.5 Sentiment
In the field of behavioral finance, the notion of investor sentiment is much more
prominent than that of disagreement, and consequently has been the subject of a
broader and more thorough investigation. In this section, rather than aim at any
sort of exhaustive presentation, wewill briefly try to identify the pointswhere the
two show similarities, where they differ, and possibly where they might interact.
Both disagreement and sentiment can be understood as deviations from ra-
tional expectations, and neither would exist in a world populated by rational
investors who correctly maximize their utility. Recently, Shefrin (2005) proposed
a framework in which behavioral finance could be, methodologically speaking,
made compatible with the neoclassical setup. In his view, sentiment should be
understood as the deviation from the pricing kernel, or stochastic discount fac-
tor (SDF), of a market with rational, representative investors, in which prices are
efficient16.
Under such a generalization, sentiment can be understood as encompassing
disagreement, if it were not for the fact that, in a first approach, nothing pre-
vents all investors to have the same sentiment function, a situation inwhich there
would of course be no disagreement. The framework, however, easily allows for
heterogeneous beliefs, inwhich different investors have different sentiment func-
tions.
More recently, Barone-Adesi et al. (2013) have proposed an extension of She-
frin (2005), in which they derive a theoretically-based notion of sentiment using
options prices. Their setup also allows to discriminate between overconfidence
and optimism, with the former concept playing a substantial role inmost models
of disagreement. Their approach, which provides results consistent with tradi-
16 More precisely, the core idea put forward is that the log-SDF can be expressed as a sum of
sentiment, and two fundamental terms.
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tional sentiment measures such as the one of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is illus-
trative of attempts to unify the field, and goes to show that the the words use to
designate deviations from rationality have no definition set in stone.
That being said, such an harmonization under a common methodology has
still not happened, and a lot of research is still being conducted using "tradi-
tional" conceptions of disagreement and sentiment. What could be said about
their linkages in this context?
A key difference between sentiment and disagreement is that the former is
almost always amarketmeasure, while the latter is, in amajority of cases, an asset
specificmeasure. There are papers who consider disagreement as amarket-wide
feature17, but many seminal results were obtained when considering stock-level
disagreement, as for instance in Diether et al. (2002).
Generally, there is an intuitive appeal to the thought that a higher level of sen-
timent would be accompanied by higher levels of disagreement. If one assumes
that some proportion of investors, the smart arbitrageurs, hold beliefs that stay
close to the fundamental value no matter the levels of sentiment, we would ex-
pect, consequently, a rise in disagreement. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and
Lamont and Thaler (2003) find that unsophisticated, or noise traders, are more
likely to participate in the stock market during periods of high sentiment, which
would, in turn, bring higher disagreement levels.
17 A concept often put forward by Harrison Hong, see for instance Hong and Stein (2007), or
more recently Hong and Sraer (2016).
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Chapter 2
According to Discord
The Risk-Return Relationship through
Disagreement
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between the risk of a financial asset and its expected return is at
the heart of asset pricing, and is of utmost importance for finance practitioners
and researchers. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965) provides a model to depict this relationship, using market beta as
a risk measure, and expecting a positive link between risk and return.
In practice, however, high-risk assets often deliver lower expected returns
than low-risk assets, a fact that has led to investigation attempts nearly as old
as the CAPM itself. Black (1972) and Black et al. (1972) are among the first to
document it. More recently, Baker et al. (2011) have shown that the performance
of stocks is actually declining with market beta. What are the factors that might
explain this puzzle?
One promising avenue of investigation that has gained a lot of recent attention
consists of taking a closer look at the dynamics of disagreement among market
participants.
There is no uniform andwidely shared definition of disagreement among be-
havioral finance practitioners. Dispersion of opinion among investors can arise
through many different ways, and consequently be conceived as the manifesta-
tion of many different phenomena. One of those is that of gradual information
flows, with news arriving at different times for different investors, as presented
in Hong and Stein (1999) and put to the test in Hong et al. (2000). Another is lim-
ited attention, inwhich some investors focus on a subset ofmore easily accessible
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information, as in Barber and Odean (2008). Yet another possibility is that of het-
erogeneous priors, that is to say, even if all news arrive simultaneously, and all
investors pay equal attention to it, there would still be a dispersion in their inter-
pretation of the impact of these news, because investors have different economic
models. On this subject, the seminal works are Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kan-
del and Pearson (1995). A recent review of disagreement and its importance in
the analysis of stockmarkets is proposed inHong and Stein (2007). As they point
out, models built around the notion of disagreement also present the advantage
of providing a framework in which both patterns in trade volumes and effects
on prices can be reconciled, in comparison with other models which focused on
generating trade volume1.
Typically, it is measured at the stock-level, leveraging the proxy of analysts
forecasts2. Diether et al. (2002) show that higher stock-level dispersion of earn-
ings forecasts are linked to lower expected returns for a period of up to sixmonths,
thus establishing how an individual measure of disagreement can explain mar-
ket dynamics. Other authors find results that point in the opposite direction.
Anderson et al. (2005) find that dispersion factors (portfolios that are long in
high dispersion stocks and short in low dispersion stocks) are positively related
to expected returns. Qu et al. (2003) also observe a positive relation between a
factor for disagreement and expected returns.
There is a growing body of literature that takes interest in the influence of
market-wide measures of sentiment on the stock market3. The notion of dis-
agreement has been viewed in such a manner to a lesser extent. A notable ex-
ception is Hong and Sraer (2016), who build amarket-level aggregate time-series
of disagreement. They find that in high market disagreement periods, high beta
stocks, which are more susceptible to disagreement, experience lower than ex-
pected returns.
Another strand of literature takes interest in whether disagreement can rep-
resent a priced risk factor in itself. Anderson et al. (2009) use disagreement mea-
sures as a proxy for uncertainty, using the quarterly Survey of Professional Fore-
casters, and a flexible weighting scheme for individual forecasts. They propose
that economic agents interpret disagreement as model uncertainty, and obtain
that their resulting measure of uncertainty has strong implications in terms of
uncertainty-returns trade-off, and in the cross-section, find that the price of un-
1 As in Varian (1989); Harris and Raviv (1993); Kandel and Pearson (1995).
2 When considering the use of analysts forecasts to proxy for disagreement, one might want
to consider what their biases might be. Reassuring signals include O’brien (1988), who finds
that analysts perform better than time series models to forecast earnings, and Abarbanell et al.
(1995), who finds that analysts forecasts constitute appropriate proxies for investor beliefs.
3 A prominent example is Baker and Wurgler (2006)
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certainty is significantly positive. Buraschi et al. (2014a) build an aggregate dis-
agreement riskmeasure on the basis of I/B/E/S forecasts. They construct factor-
mimicking portfolios to obtain a risk factor, which they find to carry a statistically
significant nonzero factor price of risk.
While there have been some investigations in the impact of disagreement on
the risk-return relationship, to our knowledge there have been so far no attempt
at trying to gather additional insights in this regard with the help of the decom-
position of returns framework, proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b), and
implemented afterwards, amongmany others, byCampbell (1991) andCampbell
andAmmer (1993). In this chapter, we propose an empirical design that attempts
to fill that gap, by thus considering the impact of disagreement on the risk-return
dynamics, and followingCampbell and Shiller (1988a,b), we decompose stock re-
turns in two components, one related to cash flow news, and the other related
to discount rate news. Subsequently, using this decomposition framework, and
in the spirit of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), we distinguish two compo-
nents in the traditional CAPM beta: one related to cash flow risk, and the other
related to discount rate risk (which in their seminal article they coined, respec-
tively, "bad beta" and "good beta"). In their study, this distinction allows them to
provide an explanation for the surprisingly high returns traditionally observed
for value (low market-to-fundamentals) and small stocks, which they find carry
a higher proportion of cash-flow beta or "bad beta".
Recent empirical designs incorporating the decomposition of returns approach
to scrutinize the risk-return relationship can be found in Botshekan et al. (2012),
or Garrett and Priestley (2012).
Our results show that to obtain an in-depth understanding of the risk-return
relationship on the stock market, one needs not only to consider how disagree-
ment states can influence market dynamics, but also the differential impact dis-
agreement exerts on the decomposed risk measures that are cash flow and dis-
count rate betas.
We leverage both approaches to deliver the insight that in high disagreement
periods, high-risk assets deliver lower returns than low-risk assets. This finding
is consistent with Hong and Sraer (2016) in which by the fact that higher beta
stocks are more susceptible to disagreement, and in the presence limits to arbi-
trage (in the form of short-selling restrictions), the price signal is transmitted to
the market in a disproportionate manner by investors who hold higher valua-
tions, pushing prices up, and returns down. These findings are also consistent
with the Miller (1977) hypothesis that, since divergence of opinion is likely to
increase with risk, expected returns may be be lower for risky securities. Ac-
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cordingly, both in the case of cash flow and discount rate betas, we observe a
downward-sloping relationship between returns and risk.
In periods associated with lower levels of aggregate disagreement, however,
the impact is differentiated: with respect to cash flow betas, i.e., risk related to
unexpected news related to dividends, we observe a positive, upward-sloping
curve. In this situation, risk seems appropriately priced by market participants,
leading to lower prices and higher returns. In the case of discount rate betas,
results point to an two-piece curve, showing an inverted U-shape, with higher
discount rate betas stocks being associated to lower returns after a certain point.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, wedescribe our data collect-
ing process, detail the empirical procedures we used, and relate them to existing
works. In Section 2.3, wewill provide an exploration of our results, and put them
in perspective with previous literature. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Sample Construction
The main source for the data used in this paper is S&P Capital IQ. We start from
a sample of 27,719 publicly listed US companies. We remove those for which
Capital IQ ends up returning an error, and obtain 27,253 companies. We remove
the companies for whom there never was more than 4 analysts, which amounts
to 20,612 companies, and obtain a new total of 6,641 companies. We remove those
for which, if there was analyst coverage, it was by fewer than four on average, a
criteria which is met for 1,910 companies in our sample. Our new total is 4,731
companies. 2,538 of them do not have the US dollar as both their listing currency,
and the currency used for their estimates reporting.
From the remaining 2,193 companies, following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001),
we do not include in our sample stocks forwhich the valuation is belowUSD 5, in
order to ensure that our results are not overly driven by small and illiquid stocks,
or by the bid-ask bounce. Several identifiers return error codes for all or part of
their data when queried in the database, and are thus also removed. Our final
sample is composed of 2,085 companies.
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2.2.2 Decomposition of Returns
The Return-Decomposition Framework
In their seminal article, Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b) posit that two separate
elements can be discerned in the data generation process of stock returns, in the
formof news impacting themarket that are related to future dividends, and news
that are related to future rates of return. They are respectively referred to as cash
flow and discount rate news.
Most of the subsequent research has been performed using market-level es-
timates of cash flow and discount rate news, for instance Campbell and Ammer
(1993) and Campbell (1991), in which the analysis was on the part of the total
unexpected returns’ variance that was attributable to each of the two.
It is of note that it is possible to study the impact of firm-specific cash flow and
discount rate news, for instance Vuolteenaho (2002) has done so to distinguish
which of the two sources has the largest influence on a firm’s stock returns4.
Thismethodological approach and the followingderivations are owed toCamp-
bell and Vuolteenaho (2004); Chen and Zhao (2009); Chen et al. (2013).
The idea that unexpected stock returns can be approximated by a linear com-
bination of cashflow (CF) news anddiscount rate (DR) newshas beenfirst posited
by Campbell and Shiller (1988a). In line with Campbell (1991), we use the fol-
lowing loglinear approximate decomposition of returns:
et+1 = rt+1 − Etrt+1
= (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j − (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrt+1+j
= eCF,t+1 − eDR,t+1
= NCF,t+1 −NDR,t+1
(2.1)
where rt+1 is the equity return andEt is the expectation operator at time t, ρ is
a constant close to but lower than 1, and dt is the dividend growth rate. We then
decompose the market portfolio, with et+1 being the unexpected market return,
and eCF,t+1 and −eDR,t+1 its CF news and DR news components.
In the following, the time subscript is suppressed when possible. The market
beta is defined as
βi =
Cov(ei, e)
V ar(e)
(2.2)
4 Amore recent stream of research in the accounting literature concernedwith firm-level of cash
flow and discount rate news includes Callen and Segal (2004), Callen et al. (2005) and Callen
et al. (2006).
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where ei is the return of asset i. Similarly to the market portfolio, it can be de-
composed into two elements:
βi =
Cov(ei, eCF )
V ar(e)
+
Cov(ei,−eDR)
V ar(e)
= βi,CF + βi,DR (2.3)
where βi,CF and βi,CF are, respectively, the CF beta and DR beta for asset i.
In the empirical implementation, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) assume
that a vector of state variables, zt+1, which we will discuss in greater detail, are
generated by a first-order vector autoregression (VAR):
zt+1 = Γzt + ut+1
rt+1 = e1
′zt+1
(2.4)
where zt+1 is a k×1 state vector with rt+1 as its first element, Γ is a k×kmatrix
of coefficients, e1 is a vector whose first element is equal to one and zero other-
wise, and ut+1 is a vector of serially independent randomshocks. The unexpected
market return at time t+ 1 is then the first element of ut+1, i.e. e1′ut+1 = ut+1.
Through recursive substitution of Equation (2.4) in Equation (2.1), we obtain
the following for CF news and DR news:
−NDR,t+1 = −e1′λut+1
NCF,t+1 = (e1
′ + e1′λ)ut+1
(2.5)
where λ = ρΓ(I − ρΓ)−1, . The gist is that, because of the predictability of
the expected return (through the VAR), surprises in the current state variables
will be incorporated into the expected return for every future period, through
the term −e1′λut+1.
Then,
βi,CF ≡ (e1′ + e1′λ)Cov(ei,t, ut)
V ar(e)
(2.6)
βi,DR ≡ −e1′λCov(ei,t, ut)
V ar(e)
(2.7)
where Cov(ei,t, ut) is a vector of covariance between firm i’s stock return and
the innovations in the state variables.
Empirical Implementation using the VAR methodology
In our calculations, and following Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), we make
two adjustments. First, we use excess returns in the VAR and the calculation of
betas. Second, we include one lag of the market news when calculating the betas
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in order to mitigate the stale-price problem.
The cash flow β for asset i is thus calculated as follows
β̂i,CF =
Ĉov(ri,t, N̂CF,t)
V̂ ar(N̂CF,t − N̂DR,t)
(2.8)
. The denominator is the variance of unexpected market returns, V ar(eˆ). The
corresponding discount rate beta is
β̂i,DR =
Ĉov(ri,t,−N̂DR,t)
V̂ ar(N̂CF,t − N̂DR,t)
(2.9)
Of crucial importance in the empirical implementation is the choice of vari-
ables to include in the vector zt. In theory, the decomposition of returns as pro-
posed byCampbell and Shiller (1988b)works soundly. In practice, themethodol-
ogy depends on the ability to provide good instruments to estimate both return
components.
Our approach, which entails estimating discount rate news and backing out
cash flow news is themost commonly used in the literature5. It provides a way to
sidestep the issue that one would have with estimating the data cash flow news
in monthly (or higher) frequency given the seasonal nature of dividends. While
it has been widely and successfully used, it also has considerable drawbacks,
identified among others by Chen and Zhao (2009). Return predictability regres-
sions often have small predictive power, are extremely sensitive to the choice of
variables (in the VAR case for instance, in the choice of state variables to include
in the zt vector). Backing out CF news means from the difference between total
returns and discount rate news inevitably means that any misspecification error
in the estimation of discount rate news is bound to trickle down in the estimation
of cash flow news, compounding its impact.
As they point out, the motivation for the variables to include in the VAR
should come from outside the model. In practice, authors sometimes purpose-
fully try a large combination of variables in order to find the most fruitful com-
bination, which then gives credence to the accusation of the "fishing license" cri-
tique made by Fama (1991).
With the hope of circumventing part of the disadvantages brought by back-
ing out cash flow news from a necessarily flawed discount rate news estimate,
Chen and Zhao (2009) or Garrett and Priestley (2012), advocate a direct estima-
tion of both cash flow and discount rate news, a method which is theoretically
5 Among others, Campbell (1991); Campbell and Ammer (1993)
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appealing but also requires necessary and costly compromises when it comes to
actual implementation. Campbell et al. (2010) propose a virulent rebuttal of that
critique.
Another crucial parameter to consider when implementing is the choice of
the period of estimation for the VAR, with a large number of existing research in
this area focusing on the different results obtained when estimating the VAR in
various different subperiods 6.
Given that no agreed upon consensus has emerged from the debate with re-
gards to the methodology, we resort to using in our analysis what we we think
is a compromise that presents the advantage of providing, if not exactly a wide
agreement, at the very least what can be considered a basic and robust approach.
We thus choose to estimate discount rate news, and in a second stage back out
cash flow news. To estimate discount rate news, we use VAR for which the state
vector includes variables put forward in a recent implementation in Chen et al.
(2013)7. These are dividend growth, the dividend-price ratio, and eqis, which
corresponds to Percent Equity Issuing, i.e. the ratio of equity issuing activity as a
fraction of total issuing activity8.
2.2.3 Disagreement Measures
We are interested in the manner by which disagreement affects the relationship
between risk and returns. Given that disagreement is intrinsically unobservable,
researchers often rely on proxies9. In line with most of the literature, we will use
analysts forecasts. More precisely, we use as our proxy the dispersion in analyst
forecasts of the Earnings Per Share (EPS) at the end of the current fiscal year,
obtained via the S&P Capital IQ database.
While our first analysis will focus on the impact of stock-level dispersion of
forecasts on returns, we describe the method we will use to construct a time se-
ries for a market-wide measure of disagreement. How do we average all the
stock-level information to form a monthly data point? A first instinct would be
to just take an equal-weighted or value-weighted average of all stock-level stan-
dard deviation of earnings forecasts (SDEFs), and to repeat this for all periods.
What we do is close to this, except the weight we confer to each stock is based on
its CAPM’s beta. This method is similar in spirit to Yu (2011) and was also used
in Hong and Sraer (2016).
6 For instance, Chen et al. (2013) compares the period 1926-2010 to 1946-2010.
7 In their work, they use this VAR specification as a benchmark with which to compare their
methodology which proposes a direct estimation of cash flow news.
8 See Welch and Goyal (2008).
9 Other experimental methods are envisioned in Zanardo (2016).
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Our estimates for market betas by following the literature and constructing
beta portfolios. Each month, we use past weekly returns (with a minimum of
30 weeks and a maximum of 80 weeks) to regress the stock’s return on the con-
temporaneous market return. We then sort stocks in 20 beta portfolios based on
these pre-ranking betas. We compute the monthly equal-weighted returns on
these portfolios. We then compute post-ranking betas by regressing each portfo-
lio return on the market returns. These post-ranking betas are computed using
the entire sample period, following Fama and French (1992).
Weighting our stock-level disagreement measures by beta is appealing be-
cause our analysis is mostly concerned with the disagreement component of a
stock-dividend process that is related with the aggregate factor, and not with
more idiosyncratic sources of disagreement. At the extreme, a stock with a beta
of 0 would not be impacted at all by the aggregate factor, and its disagreement
can only come from idiosyncratic disagreement.
This methodology gives us to the time-series of disagreement displayed in
Figure 2.1.
Time Series of Aggregate Disagreement
Figure 2.1: Time Series of Aggregate Disagreement
Sample period: 12/1996 to 12/2015. Sample: Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding stocks
with price < $5. Each month, we calculate for each stock the standard deviation of analyst fore-
casts for the EPS, our measure of stock-level disagreement. We use portfolio post-ranking betas
to weight each individual stock’s dispersion of forecasts to obtain a monthly, aggregate disagree-
ment measure.
We have chosen to restrict our sample to firms for which we have at least
four analysts, and there are at least four data points on which to calculate the
standard deviation of forecasts. This ensures that there is sufficient information
in our dispersion measures, but might induce some bias in our results, due to
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the fact that the subgroup firms for which there is sufficient coverage might not
be a random sample of the population.
2.2.4 Estimation of returns by portfolio
At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order
on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month.
Preformation Cash Flow andDiscount Rate betas are estimated over a period not
shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted
portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and Discount Rate betas. We compute equal-
weighted excess returns for each of the resulting 40 portfolios, 20 for cash flow
betas and 20 for discount rate betas, over a period of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months.
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for our 20 portfolios based on cash flow
and discount rate betas.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Stock-level disagreement
Our first interest is to consider to what extent stock-level measures of disagree-
ment impact the relationship between our decomposed measures of risk, cash
flow news and discount rate news, and returns.
Figure 2.2 shows the average excess returns for our 40 cash flow and discount
rate beta portfolios, with cash flow portfolios on the left-hand side, and discount
rate portfolios on the right-hand side. The graph plots the average excess returns
over a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12months (in rows) for stocks in the bottom quartile of
themonthly distribution of stock-level dispersion of forecasts (in the blue circles)
and stocks in the top quartile (in the red circles).
Some patterns emerge from visual inspection. First of all, for high and low
stock-level SDEF stocks, and in accord with a trove of previous empirical results,
we see that the relationship between excess returns and measures of risk, here
cash flow and discount rate betas, does not appear to be positive. This is in agree-
ment with the findings of Black (1972), or more recently of Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014), who explain this by building a model with investors faced with funding
constraints. We note, however, that our analysis leave out the middle half of our
sample, each month, for which the stock-level SDEF lies either in the second of
third quartile of the empirical distribution, and which might display other pat-
terns.
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Returns, betas, and stock-level disagreement
Figure 2.2: Returns, betas, and stock-level disagreement
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the
beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta
at the end of the previous month. Preformation Cash Flow and Discount Rate betas are estimated over a period not
shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and
Discount Rate betas. The graph plots the average excess returns over a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months for stocks in the
bottom quartile of stock-level disagreement (blue circles) and months in the top quartile of stock-level disagreement (red
circles).
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for 20 beta-sorted portfolios
Sample: Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order
on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation Cash Flow and Discount Rate betas are estimated over a period
not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for both cash flow betas and discount rate betas. We compute
the full-sample beta of these 20 beta-sorted portfolios using the same market model.
Cash-flow betas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
BetaEW -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.38
BetaVW -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.28
1-m return 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
12-m return 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06
Stock Disag. 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06
N Stocks 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Discount-rate betas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
BetaEW 0.06 0.23 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.60 0.68 0.73 0.81 0.83 0.87 0.91 1.00 1.08 1.14 1.23 1.34 1.48 1.66
BetaVW 0.13 0.19 0.33 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.88 0.83 0.93 1.00 1.08 1.20 1.26 1.29 1.16
1-m return 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
12-m return 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07
Stock Disag. 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.16
N Stocks 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
2.3 Results
2.3.2 Market-wide disagreement
An hypothesis we would like to investigate is whether our market-wide aggre-
gate measure of disagreement can provide additional insights.
In Figure 2.3, we perform the same analysis that we used to obtain the graphs
in Figure 2.2, but we add another layer to our analysis. We differentiate between
the returns obtained in months in the lowest quartile of the disagreement time
series, and months in the highest quartile. For each of these two sub-samples, as
in our previous analysis, we distinguish between excess returns for stocks dis-
playing low and high stock-level SDEF.
We thus obtain four different curves, for each of our separate configurations
of time horizons (1, 3, 6 and 12 months), in rows, and type of beta, in columns,
with cash flow betas portfolios on the left, and discount rate betas portfolios on
the right. We observe that the differences in the shape of their return curves are
more pronounced when we distinguish between states of market disagreement
than between stock-level disagreement. The blue and purple curve denote the
returns of high- and low- stock-level disagreement in months of low market dis-
agreement, and they are nearly indistinguishable from each other. The red and
green curves are the equivalent for months of high market disagreement. Again, we
observe the same pattern, that is to say that their shape is roughly similar, even
thoughwe also note that it would seem that the spread is a bit higher than in low
disagreement months.
Anotherway of putting this is that, while there are considerable differences in
the patterns of risk and return, it seems thatmarket-wide disagreement levels are
a more important driver in shaping this relationship than stock-level disagree-
ment.
What could explain the prevalence of our aggregate disagreement measure?
A possible explanation can be found in Figures 2.4 to 2.6, in which we highlight
the role played by aggregate disagreement on the relationship between stock-
level disagreement on the one hand, and cash flow and discount rate betas on
the other hand. In these figures, as before, we have divided our time series of
aggregate disagreement into high aggregate-disagreement months (blue circles)
and low-aggregate-disagreement months (red triangles), where high- (low-) ag-
gregate disagreement months are defined as those in the top (bottom) quartiles
of the in-sample distribution of aggregate disagreement. Then, for each of our 20
β-sorted portfolios, we plot the value-weighted average of the stock-level disper-
sion in analyst earnings forecasts against the post-ranking full sample β of the
value-weighted portfolio. We do likewise for portfolios constructed on the basis
of cash flow and discount rate betas.
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Stock-level SDEF vs Aggregate Disagreement
Figure 2.3: Stock-level SDEF vs Aggregate Disagreement
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the begin-
ning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the
end of the previousmonth. Preformation Cash Flow andDiscount Rate betas are estimated over a period not shorter than
30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and Discount
Rate betas. The graph plots the average excess returns over a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months and split our sample both
between months in the lowest and highest quartile of the disagreement distribution, and also between stocks comprising
the lowest and highest quartile of the stock-level dispersion of EPS forecasts. Aggregate disagreement is the monthly
β-weighted average of stock-level disagreement measures as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts for EPS. Note:
Curves and shaded areas are smoothing splines provided to aid with series identification and pattern recognition, and
should not be interpreted as carrying information with regards to level of statistical significance.
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Another advantage of using a market-wide measure of risk it that it allows
us not to be troubled by the issue of being able to separate, in the stock-level dis-
agreement measures, which part is attributable to idiosyncratic factors vs. com-
mon factors, such as aggregate corporate profit levels. Anderson et al. (2009), for
instance, show that in theory, individual disagreement matters only when this
divergence of opinion is correlated with aggregate market sentiment 10.
Stock-Level SDEF vs. Standard Betas
Figure 2.4: Stock-Level SDEF vs. Standard Betas
Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each
calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated
beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation standard betas are estimated over a period
not shorter than 30weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for
standard betas. The graph plots the equal-weighted average stock-level disagreement of stocks in
20 portfolios for months in the bottom 25% of aggregate disagreement (blue circles) and months
in the top 25% of aggregate disagreement (red triangles).
We see that stock-level disagreement generally increases with β, and impor-
tantly that this relationship is markedly steeper in periods of high disagreement,
denoted by red triangles. The trend is especially clear for standard and cash
flow betas. We do note some discontinuities in the case of discount rate betas for
medium to low values of beta, but the trend still points to an increasing relation-
10 Even though in their case, they are interested in disagreement as it pertains to uncertainty, in
its Knightian interpretation of an unknown unknown.
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Stock-Level SDEF vs. Cash-flow Betas
Figure 2.5: Stock-Level SDEF vs. Cash-flow Betas
Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each
calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated
beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation Cash Flow and Discount Rate betas are
estimated over a periodnot shorter than 30weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-
weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas andDiscount Rate betas. The graph plots the equal-
weighted average stock-level disagreement of stocks in 20 cash-flow portfolios for months in the
bottom 25% of aggregate disagreement (blue circles) and months in the top 25% of aggregate
disagreement (red triangles).
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Stock-Level SDEF vs. Discount-rate Betas
Figure 2.6: Stock-Level SDEF vs. Discount-rate Betas
Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each
calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated
beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation Cash Flow and Discount Rate betas are
estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20
equal-weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and Discount Rate betas. The graph plots
the equal-weighted average stock-level disagreement of stocks in 20 discount-rate portfolios for
months in the bottom 25% of aggregate disagreement (blue circles) and months in the top 25%
of aggregate disagreement (red triangles).
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ship between stock-level dispersion of forecasts and mean betas. This observa-
tion also directly lends support to Miller (1977), in which divergence of opinion
is expected to be higher for riskier securities.
In Tables 2.2 to 2.4, we propose anotherway to look into this. These tables aim
to show the contrast in excess returns in the cases of respectively standard betas
portfolios, cash flow, and discount rate portfolios. Panel A shows the difference
between low- and high- stock-level disagreement stocks, for months with simi-
lar levels of aggregate disagreement. Panel B does the opposite, and shows the
difference between the excess returns in months of low and high disagreement,
for stocks with similar measures of dispersion of forecasts. The row difference
is the square difference. For each sub-panel, we also provide the mean squared
difference across all portfolios.
Our intention at this stage is to gain insight as to which measure of disagree-
ment better explains the differences in returns. To do so, we draw attention to
the measures of mean squared difference that are presented, in each table, for
each of the four sub-panels. We are interested in both the difference between
sub-panels within each panel, bet, and differences across panels.
In Table 2.2, we see in Panel A that the mean squared difference between
stocks with high stock-level SDEF is similar in states of low and high disagree-
ment, with values of 0.0014 and 0.0162 respectively. Similarly, in Panel B, we
observe that the mean difference between states of low and high disagreement is
similar in the sub-sample comprised of low stock-level SDEF stocks to the value
for high-level SDEF stocks, with measures of 0.0166 and 0.016 respectively. At
this stage, we do not see any trace of the pattern we are looking for.
The picture appears quite different for portfolios formed on decomposed be-
tas, however. In Table 2.3, the table which presents the results for cash flow betas
portfolios, we see that the mean squared differences we obtain in Panel B, of
0.0149 and 0.0372, are much higher than what we obtain in Panel A, i.e. 0.0024
and 0.0067. This leads us to think that the difference that matters the most is the
one between disagreement market states, rather than the one between disagree-
ment at the stock level.
Furthermore, we also see that the difference we do observe between low and
high stock-level SDEF stocks is higher in states of highdisagreement, with amean
difference of 0.0067 that is three times as high as the one in low disagreement,
of 0.0024. This could point to the fact that, while the difference in stock-level
disagreement can matter, it does so in a clearer manner in periods of high dis-
agreement.
Table 2.4, as expected, shows very similar results to the ones we observed
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in Table 2.3. We observe the same pattern that the mean squared differences
in returns are higher between market disagreement states, holding stock-level
disagreement constant, than vice-versa. And also in a similar fashion, it’s in high
disagreement months that the difference in returns is higher between low and
high stock-level SDEF stocks.
In Figure 2.7, we represent the association between our decomposed betas
and returns in months of low and high aggregate disagreement.
Compared with Figure 2.2, the relationships are more marked. Importantly,
the range we obtain in values for excess returns between low and high disagree-
ment is much higher than when comparing low and high stock-level SDEF, a
result which is consistent with the results obtained in Tables 2.2 to 2.4.
Clearer patterns appear this time around. Striking differences, underlined by
consistent patterns, appear both in the distinction between cash flow and dis-
count rate betas, and also in the distinction between periods of low agreement
and periods of high disagreement.
An upward relationship between a measure of risk and returns appears in
only one configuration, when considering the relationship between cash flow
betas and returns in periods of low disagreement. In this case, the curve displays
a cubic aspect, with a slopemore pronounced for low and high values, and nearly
flat for medium values of cash flow betas.
In periods of high disagreement, the relationship between cash flowbetas and
returns is comparatively much flatter, displaying a slightly inverted-U shape.
With regards to discount rate betas, in periods of highdisagreement, the slope
is markedly negative, with a small bump for low betas. In periods of low dis-
agreement, we see an inverted U-shape pattern that is highly reminiscent of the
pattern observed in Hong and Sraer (2016), i.e an upward slope, until a certain
value, where a "kick" is observed, and the relationship inverts, and displays a
downward slope. Such a result also agrees with Baker et al. (2011) who find that
the cumulative performance of stocks is actually declining with beta.
These results are consistent with the Miller (1977) interpretation that in the
presence of some restrictions to the shorting abilities of investors, when there
is some level of disagreement among market participants, pessimists are shut
off the market, conferringmore influence to the price signal carried by optimistic
investors 11. This is also consistent with Diether et al. (2002), even though in their
case, they consider stock-level dispersion of forecasts.
We suggest the following interpretation. In periods of high disagreement, the
relationship between returns and measures of risk breaks down. Both for cash
11 Also sometimes referred to as sentiment investors.
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Returns, betas, and disagreement
Figure 2.7: Returns, betas, and disagreement
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the
beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta
at the end of the previous month. Preformation Cash Flow and Discount Rate betas are estimated over a period not
shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and
Discount Rate betas. The graph plots the average excess returns over a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months for months in
the bottom quartile of aggregate disagreement (blue circles) and months in the top quartile of aggregate disagreement
(red circles). Aggregate disagreement is the monthly β-weighted average of stock-level disagreement measures as the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts for EPS.
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Table 2.2: Stock-Level Dispersion of Forecasts vs. Aggregate Market Disagreement
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation standard betas are estimated over
a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The table shows differences in excess returns across
two-way splits of the sample, one in the time series of aggregate market disagreement, and the other in the individual stocks, in levels of stock-level standard
deviation of earnings forecasts. In Panel A, for each standard portfolio, we hold constant the level of market disagreement in each sub-panel, and compare
average excess returns for stocks with low and high levels of stock-level SDEF. In Panel B, the two sub-panels correspond to two sub-samples of different SDEF
stocks, for which we compare the average excess returns in low and high aggregate disagreement states. The line "Difference" corresponds to the squared
difference in excess returns.
Standard Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Panel A : Within market disagreement states, the impact of stock-level standard deviation of forecasts
Low Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0014
Low SL-SDEF 0.1985 0.0820 0.0262 0.0337 0.0495 0.0505 0.0452 0.0397 0.0341 0.0285 0.0449 0.0553 0.0507 0.0461 0.0422 0.0388 0.0345 0.0528 0.0031 -0.0131
High SL-SDEF 0.3278 0.0684 0.0868 0.0766 0.0848 0.0742 0.0569 0.0226 0.0390 0.0369 0.0109 0.0440 0.0534 0.0491 0.0167 0.0655 0.0647 0.0275 0.0006 -0.0100
Difference 0.0167 0.0002 0.0037 0.0018 0.0012 0.0006 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0012 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000
High Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0162
Low SL-SDEF -0.1045 0.0137 0.0116 0.0221 0.0001 0.0265 0.0209 0.0281 0.0293 0.0321 0.0243 0.0284 0.0504 0.0285 0.0255 0.0288 0.0427 0.0413 0.0400 -0.4898
High SL-SDEF -0.0670 -0.0431 -0.0080 -0.0213 -0.0328 -0.0466 -0.0356 -0.0535 -0.0602 -0.0550 -0.0435 -0.0398 -0.0470 -0.0516 -0.0429 -0.0364 -0.0570 -0.0464 -0.0850 -0.0231
Difference 0.0014 0.0032 0.0004 0.0019 0.0011 0.0053 0.0032 0.0067 0.0080 0.0076 0.0046 0.0047 0.0095 0.0064 0.0047 0.0043 0.0099 0.0077 0.0156 0.2178
Panel B : Considering the returns of stock with similar SDEF, the impact of market disagreement states
Low SL-SDEF Stocks – Mean Difference : 0.0166
Low Disagreement 0.1985 0.0820 0.0262 0.0337 0.0495 0.0505 0.0452 0.0397 0.0341 0.0285 0.0449 0.0553 0.0507 0.0461 0.0422 0.0388 0.0345 0.0528 0.0031 -0.0131
High Disagreement -0.1045 0.0137 0.0116 0.0221 0.0001 0.0265 0.0209 0.0281 0.0293 0.0321 0.0243 0.0284 0.0504 0.0285 0.0255 0.0288 0.0427 0.0413 0.0400 -0.4898
Difference 0.0918 0.0047 0.0002 0.0001 0.0024 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0007 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0014 0.2272
High SL-SDEF Stocks – Mean Difference : 0.016
Low Disagreement 0.3278 0.0684 0.0868 0.0766 0.0848 0.0742 0.0569 0.0226 0.0390 0.0369 0.0109 0.0440 0.0534 0.0491 0.0167 0.0655 0.0647 0.0275 0.0006 -0.0100
High Disagreement -0.0670 -0.0431 -0.0080 -0.0213 -0.0328 -0.0466 -0.0356 -0.0535 -0.0602 -0.0550 -0.0435 -0.0398 -0.0470 -0.0516 -0.0429 -0.0364 -0.0570 -0.0464 -0.0850 -0.0231
Difference 0.1559 0.0124 0.0090 0.0096 0.0138 0.0146 0.0086 0.0058 0.0098 0.0084 0.0030 0.0070 0.0101 0.0101 0.0036 0.0104 0.0148 0.0055 0.0073 0.0002
Table 2.3: Stock-Level Dispersion of Forecasts vs. Aggregate Market Disagreement, CF Portfolios
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation cash flow and discount rate betas
are estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The table shows differences in
excess returns across two-way splits of the sample, one in the time series of aggregate market disagreement, and the other in the individual stocks, in levels
of stock-level standard deviation of earnings forecasts. In Panel A, for each cash flow beta portfolio, we hold constant the level of market disagreement in
each sub-panel, and compare average excess returns for stocks with low and high levels of stock-level SDEF. In Panel B, the two sub-panels correspond to two
sub-samples of different SDEF stocks, for which we compare the average excess returns in low and high aggregate disagreement states. The line "Difference"
corresponds to the squared difference in excess returns.
CF Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Panel A : Within market disagreement states, the impact of stock-level standard deviation of forecasts
Low Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0024
Low SL-SDEF 0.0707 0.0505 0.0963 0.0383 0.0717 0.0971 0.0650 0.0669 0.0729 0.0575 0.0570 0.0740 0.0082 0.0343 0.0806 0.0560 0.0902 0.1423 0.1118 0.1104
High SL-SDEF 0.0048 0.0594 0.0783 0.0754 0.0880 0.0642 0.1135 0.0600 0.0619 0.0975 0.0729 0.0907 0.0910 0.0979 0.1207 0.0700 0.1015 0.1111 -0.0027 0.0167
Difference 0.0043 0.0001 0.0003 0.0014 0.0003 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 0.0001 0.0016 0.0003 0.0003 0.0069 0.0040 0.0016 0.0002 0.0001 0.0010 0.0131 0.0088
High Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0067
Low SL-SDEF -0.0179 -0.0703 -0.0152 -0.0390 -0.0207 -0.0003 -0.0298 -0.0428 -0.0206 -0.0304 -0.0360 -0.0029 -0.0363 -0.0468 -0.0362 -0.0306 -0.0490 -0.0964 -0.1026 -0.0761
High SL-SDEF -0.1030 -0.0985 -0.1392 -0.0370 -0.0936 -0.0753 -0.0691 -0.0646 -0.0899 -0.1049 -0.0541 -0.1145 -0.0821 -0.1142 -0.1344 -0.1536 -0.1575 -0.1794 -0.1767 -0.2130
Difference 0.0072 0.0008 0.0154 0.0000 0.0053 0.0056 0.0015 0.0005 0.0048 0.0056 0.0003 0.0125 0.0021 0.0045 0.0096 0.0151 0.0118 0.0069 0.0055 0.0187
Panel B : Considering the returns of stock with similar SDEF, the impact of market disagreement states
Low SL-SDEF Stocks – Mean Difference : 0.0149
Low Disagreement 0.0707 0.0505 0.0963 0.0383 0.0717 0.0971 0.0650 0.0669 0.0729 0.0575 0.0570 0.0740 0.0082 0.0343 0.0806 0.0560 0.0902 0.1423 0.1118 0.1104
High Disagreement -0.0179 -0.0703 -0.0152 -0.0390 -0.0207 -0.0003 -0.0298 -0.0428 -0.0206 -0.0304 -0.0360 -0.0029 -0.0363 -0.0468 -0.0362 -0.0306 -0.0490 -0.0964 -0.1026 -0.0761
Difference 0.0078 0.0146 0.0124 0.0060 0.0085 0.0095 0.0090 0.0120 0.0087 0.0077 0.0086 0.0059 0.0020 0.0066 0.0136 0.0075 0.0194 0.0570 0.0460 0.0348
High SL-SDEF Stocks – Mean Difference : 0.0372
Low Disagreement 0.0048 0.0594 0.0783 0.0754 0.0880 0.0642 0.1135 0.0600 0.0619 0.0975 0.0729 0.0907 0.0910 0.0979 0.1207 0.0700 0.1015 0.1111 -0.0027 0.0167
High Disagreement -0.1030 -0.0985 -0.1392 -0.0370 -0.0936 -0.0753 -0.0691 -0.0646 -0.0899 -0.1049 -0.0541 -0.1145 -0.0821 -0.1142 -0.1344 -0.1536 -0.1575 -0.1794 -0.1767 -0.2130
Difference 0.0116 0.0249 0.0473 0.0126 0.0330 0.0195 0.0333 0.0155 0.0230 0.0410 0.0161 0.0421 0.0300 0.0450 0.0651 0.0500 0.0671 0.0844 0.0303 0.0528
Table 2.4: Stock-Level Dispersion of Forecasts vs. Aggregate Market Disagreement, DR Portfolios
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation cash flow and discount rate betas
are estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The table shows differences in
excess returns across two-way splits of the sample, one in the time series of aggregate market disagreement, and the other in the individual stocks, in levels
of stock-level standard deviation of earnings forecasts. In Panel A, for each discount rate beta portfolio, we hold constant the level of market disagreement in
each sub-panel, and compare average excess returns for stocks with low and high levels of stock-level SDEF. In Panel B, the two sub-panels correspond to two
sub-samples of different SDEF stocks, for which we compare the average excess returns in low and high aggregate disagreement states. The line "Difference"
corresponds to the squared difference in excess returns.
DR Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Panel A : Within market disagreement states, the impact of stock-level standard deviation of forecasts
Low Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0019
Low SL-SDEF 0.0543 0.0850 0.0462 0.0562 0.0709 0.0493 0.0680 0.0641 0.0358 0.0706 0.0626 0.0536 0.0951 0.0957 0.0943 0.1226 0.1053 0.0871 -0.0541 0.0754
High SL-SDEF 0.0331 0.0072 0.1040 0.0921 0.0541 0.0749 0.0849 0.1101 0.0807 0.0783 0.0883 0.0697 0.0917 0.0559 0.0836 0.0839 0.0999 0.1257 0.0659 0.0301
Difference 0.0004 0.0061 0.0033 0.0013 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0021 0.0020 0.0001 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0016 0.0001 0.0015 0.0000 0.0015 0.0144 0.0021
High Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.004
Low SL-SDEF 0.0400 0.0183 -0.0166 0.0033 -0.0103 -0.0156 0.0001 0.0012 -0.0274 -0.0373 -0.0590 -0.0427 -0.0430 -0.0638 -0.0610 -0.0553 -0.0865 -0.0822 -0.0917 -0.1398
High SL-SDEF -0.0656 -0.0394 -0.0175 -0.0254 -0.0308 -0.0470 -0.0731 -0.0994 -0.0728 -0.0504 -0.0937 -0.0747 -0.1331 -0.1128 -0.1267 -0.1125 -0.1372 -0.1597 -0.1980 -0.2113
Difference 0.0112 0.0033 0.0000 0.0008 0.0004 0.0010 0.0054 0.0101 0.0021 0.0002 0.0012 0.0010 0.0081 0.0024 0.0043 0.0033 0.0026 0.0060 0.0113 0.0051
Panel B : Considering the returns of stock with similar SDEF, the impact of market disagreement states
Low SL-SDEF Stocks – Mean Difference : 0.0142
Low Disagreement 0.0543 0.0850 0.0462 0.0562 0.0709 0.0493 0.0680 0.0641 0.0358 0.0706 0.0626 0.0536 0.0951 0.0957 0.0943 0.1226 0.1053 0.0871 -0.0541 0.0754
High Disagreement 0.0400 0.0183 -0.0166 0.0033 -0.0103 -0.0156 0.0001 0.0012 -0.0274 -0.0373 -0.0590 -0.0427 -0.0430 -0.0638 -0.0610 -0.0553 -0.0865 -0.0822 -0.0917 -0.1398
Difference 0.0002 0.0044 0.0039 0.0028 0.0066 0.0042 0.0046 0.0040 0.0040 0.0116 0.0148 0.0093 0.0191 0.0254 0.0241 0.0316 0.0368 0.0287 0.0014 0.0463
High SL-SDEF Stocks – Mean Difference : 0.0327
Low Disagreement 0.0331 0.0072 0.1040 0.0921 0.0541 0.0749 0.0849 0.1101 0.0807 0.0783 0.0883 0.0697 0.0917 0.0559 0.0836 0.0839 0.0999 0.1257 0.0659 0.0301
High Disagreement -0.0656 -0.0394 -0.0175 -0.0254 -0.0308 -0.0470 -0.0731 -0.0994 -0.0728 -0.0504 -0.0937 -0.0747 -0.1331 -0.1128 -0.1267 -0.1125 -0.1372 -0.1597 -0.1980 -0.2113
Difference 0.0097 0.0022 0.0148 0.0138 0.0072 0.0149 0.0250 0.0439 0.0236 0.0166 0.0331 0.0209 0.0505 0.0285 0.0442 0.0386 0.0562 0.0815 0.0696 0.0583
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flow and discount rate betas, we do not observe that higher risk assets command
a higher return. This is even more pronounced for discount rate betas.
In states of low disagreement, we see that cash flow betas reflect the high
risk premium theory predicts they should have, as derived for instance in the
discussion in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). Indeed, the compensation to
the investor of the higher risk that these stocks represents is found empirically in
higher returns.
High discount rate betas stocks, which thus carry a higher "good beta" by the
distinction established by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) (because they carry
a lower theoretical risk premium than their cash flow counterparts), seem to be
acting as a sort of "safe heaven" for investors, and even more so in periods of
high disagreement. Lower returns for high discount rate betas stocks could be
explained by the fact that such assets are the object of a greater demand in high-
disagreement times. In periods of low disagreement, however, it seems there is
a "threshold" above which this effect starts to be manifest.
At this stage, we point out that that this analysis has been carried out using
other quantiles as "low" and "high" breakpoints in our disagreement time series.
There is indeed no theoretically motivated argument that would incite us to pre-
fer a "lowest-quartile vs. highest-quartile" approach over, for instance, another
split based on thirds, or any other number. Our results, available upon request,
are quite robust to moderate modifications in the break points, but while they
do not affect our results extensively, it is inevitable that larger departures from
our specifications have an impact. This is even more pronounced given that our
database is rather short with respects to analyst’s forecasts. More extensive ro-
bustness checks revolving around the disagreement time series follow in Sec-
tion 2.3.4.
2.3.3 Robustness check – Impact of the decomposition of betas
But a fair question at this stage would be: does decomposing the betas in their
cash flow and discount rate components bring something to our analysis? Dowe
need to distinguish between these two components to gain more insight in the
influence of disagreement on the risk-return relationship?
To answer this, we take a look at our 20 portfolios based on standard betas. For
each of these portfolios, we compute the average return during lowdisagreement
months (blue dots) and high disagreement months (red dots). We perform this
analysis for four different time horizons: 1, 3, 6, and 12 months.
In Figure 2.8, we see that it is difficult to observe any real clear pattern, ex-
cept for the fact that, as expected, returns appear to be higher in low disagree-
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ment months, across all portfolios. No patterns are distinguishable in any of the
curves.
2.3.4 Robustness check – Definition of disagreement months
Asensitive aspect of ourmethodology revolves around themarket-widemeasure
of aggregate disagreement. It is crucial in the sense that it allows us to discern
between months characterized by high and low level of disagreement.
Our main approach is to follow Hong and Sraer (2016) and use the raw time
series to establish quantiles in the observedmonthly values, and then to attribute,
on the basis of quantile breakpoints, months in low and high categories.
Such a method is by no means the only way to obtain a distinction between
low and high disagreement states. First of all, it might make sense to consider
constraining the decision rule such that, at each month, it is only able to use in-
formation available to market participants at that time. Such a restriction would
prove particularly meaningful if one would be willing to consider that the find-
ings might be explained by behavioural elements, and that those behavioural
elements involve agents making a judgment with respect to the current state of
the environment, in this case, the current level of disagreement.
These methods are often grouped under the vocable "change detection", and
are the subject of particular attention to practitioners in the climate sciences,
medicine or biology. See Aminikhanghahi and Cook (2017) for a recent review
of change detection techniques.
Choosing between online methods (using only information at the chosen pe-
riod to characterize the period) or oﬄine ones (using information in the whole
time series) seems essentially contingent on one’s interpretation of the underly-
ing processes. Our argumentation mostly follows the argument put forward by
Miller (1977), in which some agents are not able to carry their price signal to the
market because of limits of arbitrage in cases of high dispersion of beliefs. This
happens whether the agent has any opinion regarding the level of disagreement
in the market or not, and therefore, it might seemmore appropriate to categorize
that level of disagreement with full information rather than time-constrained in-
formation.
We thus choose not to consider online algorithms in this situation. To ensure
our results are robust to alternative methods of distinguishing between low and
highdisagreementmonths, we propose to redo our analysis, but after detrending
our disagreement measure using a 2-year moving average. Figure 2.9 shows the
resulting time series on the right-hand side. We see that the rising trend has been
correctly filtered out of our series.
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Returns, betas, and disagreement – Standard Betas
Figure 2.8: Returns, betas, and disagreement – Standard Betas
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks
(price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on
the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Pre-formation
Standard betas are estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are
assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The graph plots the average excess returns over
a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months for months in the bottom quartile of aggregate disagreement
(blue circles) and months in the top quartile of aggregate disagreement (red circles). Aggregate
disagreement is the monthly β-weighted average of stock-level disagreement measures as the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts for EPS.
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Figure 2.9: Detrending disagreement using moving averages
Sample period: 12/1996 to 12/2015. Sample: Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding stocks
with price < $5. Each month, we calculate for each stock the standard deviation of analyst fore-
casts for the EPS, our measure of stock-level disagreement. We use portfolio post-ranking betas
to weight each individual stock’s dispersion of forecasts to obtain a monthly, aggregate disagree-
ment measure. On the left-hand side, in black, the raw time series ; in red, the moving average
using the past 2 years. On the right-hand side, the detrended resulting time series.
Here, rather than quartiles, we choose to split our resulting time series along
themedian, in amanner similar to Baker andWurgler (2006). We see that periods
of high and low disagreements are more spread out across our entire time series,
with higher values appearing at the beginning, and lowvalues in the early 2010’s.
Figure 2.10 shows the average returns for our 20 beta-sorted portfolios. We
observe that the patterns we identified in Figure 2.7 are preserved with this new
definition of high and low disagreement months. No sizable distinction is to be
noted, and the crux of our previous analysis still stands. There are some vari-
ations in the levels, for instance at the 12-month horizon, in high disagreement
months, both for cash flow and discount rate beta portfolios, where we observe
in this case more extreme negative values. Another possible deviation is the fact
that the two-piece pattern observed for cash flowbeta portfolios in high disagree-
ment months is less marked.
We have investigated the sensitivity of these results to the choice of other
quantiles for splitting the disagreement time series (ranging from the quartiles
as inHong and Sraer (2016) to themedian as in Baker andWurgler (2006)). While
some deviations are bound to happen under such modifications, no significant
pattern is modified. Results are available upon request. Even though detrending
the time series using amoving average allows us to get rid of the trend thatmight
bias our results, another critique that can be leveraged is that our results are
excessively driven by the impact of a few months in our sample. Whether this
should be considered a limitation or a feature of the analysis is, according to us,
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Returns, betas, and detrended disagreement – 2-year moving average
Figure 2.10: Returns, betas, and detrended disagreement – 2-year moving average
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks
(price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on
the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation
Cash Flow and Discount Rate betas are estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The
ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and
Discount Rate betas. The graph plots the average excess returns over a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12
months formonths in the bottom quartile of aggregate disagreement (blue circles) andmonths in
the top quartile of aggregate disagreement (red circles). Aggregate disagreement is the monthly
β-weighted average of stock-level disagreement measures as the standard deviation of analyst
forecasts for EPS, which has been detrended by the 2-year moving average.
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open to debate, as one might argue that it is precisely our intention to capture
the impact of these particular time periods.
Figure 2.11: Detrending disagreement using winsorization and moving averages
Sample period: 12/1996 to 12/2015. Sample: Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding stocks
with price < $5. Each month, we calculate for each stock the standard deviation of analyst fore-
casts for the EPS, our measure of stock-level disagreement. We use portfolio post-ranking betas
to weight each individual stock’s dispersion of forecasts to obtain a monthly, aggregate disagree-
ment measure. On the left-hand side, in black, the time series winsorized at the 0.1% level ; in
red, the moving average using the past 2 years. On the right-hand side, the detrended resulting
time series.
That being said, itmight be interesting to gainmore confidence in ourmethod-
ology, and investigate to which extent some extreme months are driving our re-
sults. We thus propose to winsorize the levels of our time series of disagreement
at the 0.1% level, which has the effect of "flattening" our curve. The resulting
series corresponds to the black curve on the left-hand side of Figure 2.11 as we
can see in Figure 2.1112.
The resulting time series displays a trend that is even more marked than our
non-winsorized time series. In this situation, choosing quantiles to distinguish
low and high disagreement months will amount to simply compare the later
months to the earlier months. To circumvent this, we again choose to detrend
this series by a 2-year moving average, which corresponds to the red curve on
the left-hand side of Figure 2.11. The result, on the right-hand side, shows that
this treatment has clearly removed both the trend and the importance of the ex-
treme months, but to such an extent that we cannot exclude that some modicum
of meaningful information has been lost in the process.
Again, we split our time series across the median, with months in the bottom
(upper) half of the distribution denoting low (high) disagreement months. The
12 Winsorization is awidely adopted practice in empirical finance, often used to (crudely) remove
outliers in variables, see for instance Stoll et al. (2003); Baker and Wurgler (2006); Fama and
French (2008); Yu (2011); Chen et al. (2013).
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returns obtained for our each of our 20 cash flowanddiscount rate beta portfolios
are in Figure 2.12. This time there are some noticeable changes in the patterns
we observed before. What might not be easily visible at the naked eye, but is of
decisive importance, is the fact that the range in returns are much tighter in this
configuration, especially at the 1, 3, and 6-months horizons. A rough estimate is
that the range has been compressed three-fold.
This is not surprising given that our manipulation of the disagreement time
series delivers a pattern of high and low disagreementmonths that is muchmore
noisy. What we do still observe are the lower returns, both for cash flow and
discount rate beta portfolios, in periods of high disagreement. For cash flow beta
portfolios, the positive or flat slope has been replaced by a downward trend.
However, it is reassuring to observe that some of the key elements are still
present in this setting. Albeit in a less pronounced way, there is still a clear dif-
ference in the risk-return relationship between low and high disagreement peri-
ods. To some extent, the two-piece curve observed in high disagreement for cash
flow betas is still present. The underlying logic appears consistently across these
modifications, which leads us to believe that the results we obtain do not depend
on certain specific time intervals being – perhaps by chance – assigned to low or
high disagreement periods. 13
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have considered the relationship between stocks and their sen-
sitivity to common market factors. Firstly, we used a vector autoregression ap-
proach to separatemarket news into two components: news related to cash flows
and news related to discount rates, and thus move from working from the tradi-
tional β measure of sensitivity to systematic risk to two distinct measures, βCF
and βDR. Additionally, we bring light to the impact that market disagreement
has on this analysis.
In accordance with most of the existing literature, we do not observe what
theory has led us to expect, i.e. a relatively linear curve that displays a constant
positive slope with respect to β. What sets our results apart from the existing
literature is that we are able to investigate separately the impact of disagreement
on cash flow and discount rate betas.
We show that, when looking at discount rate betas14, the relationship is actu-
13 The authors have performedvariations around these robustness checks and found these results
consistent with what has been reported.
14 Which are referred as the "Good Betas" in the famous dichotomy proposed by Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004).
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Returns, betas, and detrended disagreement - winsorizing and 2-year MA
Figure 2.12: Returns, betas, and detrended disagreement – winsorizing and 2-year MA
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the be-
ginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta
at the end of the previous month. Preformation Cash Flow and Discount Rate betas are estimated over a period not
shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and
Discount Rate betas. The graph plots the average excess returns over a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months for months in
the bottom quartile of aggregate disagreement (blue circles) and months in the top quartile of aggregate disagreement
(red circles). Aggregate disagreement is the monthly β-weighted average of stock-level disagreement measures as the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts for EPS, which has been first winsorized at the 0.1% level, and then detrended by
the 2-year moving average.
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ally negative. In market states in which there is a higher level of disagreement
among market participants, stocks with a high discount rate beta have lower re-
turns than stocks with lower discount rate betas. In low disagreement states, we
observe a two-piece curve, with an increasing part until a certain level of discount
rate beta, after which we observe a decreasing slope.
This indicates that cash flow betas do seem to carry a higher risk premium,
which confirms the results obtained in the ICAPM derivation of Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004). However, this is only the case in months of low disagree-
ment. Inmonths of highdisagreement, the risk-reward relationship breaks down,
associating lower returns to riskier stocks. These results have proven robust to
modifications in the definition of the time series of disagreement.
It also indicates that disagreement seems to contain a market-wide compo-
nent which exerts an influence on the valuation of financial assets, consistent
with the hypothesis of Miller (1977) in which the price signal carried by certain
investors is not transmitted to themarket if the dispersion of beliefs is sufficiently
large, and limits to arbitrage bind their short sale behavior.
Our main contribution resides in establishing the following: (1) To properly
assess the influence of disagreement, it is important to consider an aggregate,
market-widemeasure. Our results show that while it is true that stock-level mea-
sures play an important role, disagreement matters also decisively at the market-
level. (2) When considering the impact of disagreement on returns, it matters to
be able to differentiate between cash flow and discount rate betas, with the lat-
ter performing a much more dramatic role than the former in situations of high
disagreement.
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Chapter 3
It Takes Two to Tango
Disagreement and Sentiment enlighten the
Risk and Return relationship
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between the risk of a financial asset and its expected return is
at the heart of asset pricing. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965) provides amodel to depict this relationship, usingmar-
ket beta as a risk measure, and expecting a positive link between risk and return.
In practice, however, high-risk assets often deliver lower expected returns
than low-risk assets, a fact that has led to an investigation nearly as old as the
CAPM itself. Black (1972) is among the first to address it. More recently, Baker
et al. (2011) have shown that the performance of stocks is actually declining with
market beta. What are the factors that might explain this puzzle?
The idea of incorporating the impact of human behaviour biases in the analy-
sis of financial markets can be traced back at least to Keynes (1936). The manner
through which behavioral aspects influence stock markets have often been ap-
prehended through the concepts of limits to arbitrage. Miller (1977) postulates
that short-selling constraints among investors can lead to situations of overpric-
ing. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that arbitrage can still be risky even when
ignoring possible shorting costs. Barber and Odean (2008) add to the analysis by
establishing that individual investors are reluctant to hold short positions. All
these factors provide a framework which show how behavioral biases can have
long-lasting and measurable repercussions on the aggregate market outcomes.
While the existence of behavioral biases is a firmly grounded finding in in-
vestor behavior, and the manner trough which they influence the market is in-
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creasingly identified, still recently, Hirshleifer (2015) still maintained that:
There is a need for more theory and testing of the effects of feelings
on financial decisions and aggregate outcomes. Especially, the time
has come to move beyond behavioral finance to social finance, which
studies the structure of social interactions, how financial ideas spread
and evolve, and how social processes affect financial outcomes.
One of the most promising and widely discussed prisms through which re-
searchers can study the impact of behavioral biases onmarkets is the the concept
of investor sentiment. It has been shown to drive stock returns in the short run in
studies such as Simon andWiggins (2001), Brown and Cliff (2004), while longer-
term effects have been the focus in papers such as Chung et al. (2012). Stambaugh
et al. (2012) investigate the role of investor sentiment in a large set of anomalies in
cross-sectional returns ; and Yu andYuan (2011) consider how themean-variance
relationship is impacted by the fluctuations of market sentiment.
In the previous chapter, we showed how taking into account the impact of
disagreement among market participants enabled to gain key insights into the
risk-return relationship. One might wonder, did our results really capture an
effect of market disagreement, or did we end up analyzing investor sentiment,
and confusing one with the other?
While disagreement has been the subject of previous studies, it has generated
much less interest in the academic literature than the concept of investor senti-
ment. Sometimes the former is considered as merely a different manifestation
of the latter1, a fact that justifies even more a careful investigation in the relative
importance of both concepts.
Accordingly, in this chapter, wewill try to disentangle the impact of disagree-
ment and sentiment on the risk-return relationship of stocks. To do so, we will
once again leverage the decomposition of returns approach pioneered by Camp-
bell and Shiller (1988a,b), later implemented inCampbell andVuolteenaho (2004)
to consider more closely the exposure to cash flow news and discount rate news,
which they termed the "bad beta" and "good beta" of a stock, given their relative
price of risk. Other more recent examples of research using the decomposition
framework include Botshekan et al. (2012), or Garrett and Priestley (2012).
To our knowledge, our work is the first to consider the joint impact of sep-
arate measures of disagreement and sentiment on the association between re-
turns and risk of stocks, captured through separate cash flow and discount rate
betas. Several studies, however, have focused on some of those elements sepa-
rately. Stambaugh et al. (2012), who investigate the role of investor sentiment in
1 See for instance the presentation in Shefrin (2008).
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a set of anomalies in the cross section of stock returns, find that each anomaly
is stronger in months following high levels of sentiment. Studies that consider
the influence of disagreement, but focus on stock-level estimations, include Di-
ether et al. (2002), who find that stocks with high levels of dispersion of earn-
ings forecasts tend to earn lower returns, or Chen et al. (2002), who come to a
similar conclusion using breadth of ownership as their proxy for stock-level dis-
agreement. More recently, Hong and Sraer (2016), with the help of an aggregate,
market-wide, measure of disagreement, show that it influences the risk-return
relationship by leading, in situations of higher disagreement, to overpriced high-
beta stocks. Botshekan et al. (2012) examine cash flow and discount rate betas in
up and downmarkets, but their design, while similar to some degree in the gen-
eral approach, differs by the actual implementation. In their design, they split
their cash flow betas and discount rate betas to establish two separate estimates,
conditional on up- or down-market movements in the previous period.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, wedescribe our data collect-
ing process, detail the empirical procedures we used, and relate them to existing
works. In Section 3.3, wewill provide an exploration of our results, and put them
in perspective with previous literature. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Sample Construction
The main source for the data used in this paper is S&P Capital IQ. We start from
a sample of 27,719 publicly listed US companies. We remove those for which
Capital IQ ends up returning an error, and obtain 27,253 companies. We remove
the companies for whom there never was more than 4 analysts, which amounts
to 20,612 companies, and obtain a new total of 6,641 companies. We remove those
for which, if there was analyst coverage, it was by fewer than four on average, a
criteria which is met for 1,910 companies in our sample. Our new total is 4,731
companies. 2,538 of them do not have the US dollar as both their listing currency,
and the currency used for their estimates reporting.
From the remaining 2,193 companies, following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001),
we do not include in our sample stocks forwhich the valuation is belowUSD 5, in
order to ensure that our results are not overly driven by small and illiquid stocks,
or by the bid-ask bounce. Several identifiers return error codes for all or part of
their data when queried in the database, and are thus also removed. Our final
sample is composed of 2,085 companies.
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3.2.2 Decomposition of Returns
The Return-Decomposition Framework
We refer the reader to Section 2.2.2 for the description of the methodology used
in the decomposition of returns.
3.2.3 Time Series for Sentiment and Disagreement
Our market-wide estimate for investor sentiment is the one proposed by Baker
and Wurgler (2006). Their sentiment index is formed by taking the first princi-
pal component of six measures of investor sentiment, which are the closed-end
fund discount, the number and the first-day returns of IPOs, NYSE turnover,
the equity share in total new issues, and the dividend premium. The principal
component analysis allows them to filter idiosyncratic signal from the individual
components to obtain a common component, which is the index we use.
We use the same time series for disagreement as the one in the previous chap-
ter. In a first stage wemeasure stock-level disagreement as the dispersion in ana-
lysts’ forecasts of the EPS at the end of current fiscal year. To come upwith an ag-
gregatemeasure ofmarket disagreement, we use aweighting scheme in the same
vein as Yu (2011) and Hong and Sraer (2016). Each month, we use past weekly
returns (with a minimum of 30 weeks and a maximum of 80 weeks) to regress
the stock’s return on the contemporaneous market return. We then sort stocks
in 20 beta portfolios based on these pre-ranking betas. We compute the monthly
equal-weighted returns on these portfolios. We then compute post-ranking betas
by regressing each portfolio returns on the market returns. These post-ranking
betas are computed using the entire sample period, following Fama and French
(1992).
We then weight each month stock-level dispersion of forecasts by these post-
ranking betas.
Figure 3.1 show the market-wide time series for disagreement and sentiment
that we are gonna use in our analysis.
3.2.4 Estimation of returns by portfolio
At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order
on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month.
Preformation Cash Flow andDiscount Rate betas are estimated over a period not
shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted
portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and Discount Rate betas. We compute equal-
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Time Series of Sentiment and Aggregate Disagreement
Figure 3.1: Time Series of Sentiment and Aggregate Disagreement
Sample period: 12/1996 to 12/2015. Sample: Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding stocks
with price < $5. Disagreement:Each month, we calculate for each stock the standard deviation of
analyst forecasts for the EPS, our measure of stock-level disagreement. We use portfolio post-
ranking betas to weight each individual stock’s dispersion of forecasts to obtain a monthly, ag-
gregate disagreement measure. Sentiment: We use the sentiment time series proposed by Baker
and Wurgler (2006).
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weighted excess returns (over the risk-free rate) for each of our 40 portfolios over
a period of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months.
3.3 Results
Our main results are represented in Figure 3.2 2. In this Figure, we make the dis-
tinction between forward excess returns from month in four different combina-
tions of disagreement and sentiment market states. Each of these combinations
are represented by a separate curve.
Several elements can be discerned from visual inspection. First of all, in all
configurations, our four curves are distinguishable from one another. Neither
sentiment nor disagreement appears to drive results at the expense of the other
factor, to the extent that, for instance, forward excess returns in low disagree-
ment months show a different dynamic depending on whether these low dis-
agreement months happen to experience low or high levels of market sentiment.
More precisely, we observe that the security market line is flat for months in
the low sentiment, high disagreement configuration, displays a positive slope in
months of low disagreement and low sentiment, and a negative slope in months
of high sentiment, but markedly more so when disagreement is also high.
Finding a negative slope for the security market line in periods of high senti-
ment agreeswithAntoniou et al. (2016), who find in their study (which considers
sentiment only) that the securitymarket line appears in accordance with the cap-
ital asset pricing model in pessimistic periods, but is downward sloping during
optimistic periods. They posit that this is due to optimism attracting traders in
riskier investment opportunities, in the form of high beta stocks, driving prices
high and returns low, whereas such traders are less active in pessimistic periods.
Our results are consistent with their findings, but also show that this is decisively
more so in periods in which disagreement is also high. In the case of cash flow
betas, this is less pronounced for lower beta stocks, while the slope is more pro-
nounced for all values of betas in the case of discount rate betas. Rationales for
negative associations between risk and return when considering the influence of
sentiment are also presented in the reference work of Shefrin (2008).
These results are also consistentwith Yu (2011), who find that the relationship
between risk and return, while positive when the Baker-Wurgler index is low, is
2 In this and other figures which contain four separate series, while we felt it was worthwhile,
for comparison purposes, to include them in the same graph, doing so impeded slightly on
the readability of the figures. To help with series identification, we made the choice to add
smoothing splines. These should not be interpreted as carrying information with regards to
levels of statistical significance.
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Figure 3.2: Returns, Betas, Sentiment, and Disagreement
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the begin-
ning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the
end of the previousmonth. Preformation Cash Flow andDiscount Rate betas are estimated over a period not shorter than
30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios for both Cash Flow betas and Discount
Rate betas. The graph plots the average excess returns over a period of 1, 3, 6 and 12months for months in the bottom and
top quartiles of aggregate disagreement and sentiment. Disagreement: Each month, we calculate for each stock the stan-
dard deviation of analyst forecasts for the EPS, our measure of stock-level disagreement. We use portfolio post-ranking
betas to weight each individual stock’s dispersion of forecasts to obtain a monthly, aggregate disagreement measure.
Sentiment: We use the sentiment time series proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Note: Curves and shaded areas are
smoothing splines provided to aid with series identification and pattern recognition, and should not be interpreted as
carrying information with regards to level of statistical significance.
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weakened when it is high. This also agrees with Barone-Adesi et al. (2013), who
find that the risk-return relationship can be negative due to excessive optimism3.
While our results confirm previous empirical findings with regards to sen-
timent, they also bring to light that incorporating disagreement in the analysis
also proves decisive. Hong and Sraer (2016) find that high beta stocks display a
"kick" in their security market line in periods of high disagreement, due to the
fact that in such a situation, some investors facing short-selling limitations, such
as mutual funds, are not able to carry their price signal to the market, leading
overly optimistic investors to overprice higher beta stocks, and driving their re-
turns down. We can see that such an effect can be seen in our results, with the
purple curve corresponding returns obtained during low disagreement, low in-
vestment months, experiencing a downgrade in high beta returns, both for cash
flow and discount rate betas, in higher disagreement months, which correspond
to the green curve. This effect is less visible for high sentiment months, in which
there is still a decisive difference according to the level of disagreement, butmore
at a level basis, especially for middle values of cash flow and discount rate betas.
When considering differences between cash flow and discount rate betas, the
main contrast appear in periods of high sentiment. For cash flowbetas, inmonths
of high disagreement and high sentiment, the security market line appears flat
for low tomediumvalues of betas, while the slope is negative for all values of dis-
count rate betas. We also observe that the concavity for low disagreement, high
sentiment months appears higher for cash flow betas. We propose a robustness
check, that replicated Figure 3.2 for portfolios based on standard betas (and not
with cash flow and discount rate betas) in the following subsection.
Another investigation in the respective influence of disagreement and senti-
ment on returns is presented in Tables 3.1 to 3.3. In these, we present anotherway
to assess the information presented in Figure 3.2, for respectively standard betas
portfolios, cash flow betas portfolios, and discount rate beta portfolios. In each
of these, Panel A examines, within market states characterized by similar level
of aggregate disagreement, the impact of sentiment variations. Panel B does the
same for the opposite contrast, that is to say, we observe the relative impact of
disagreement variations within months in the same quartile of sentiment lev-
els. The row "Difference" is calculated by taking the squared difference of the
two previous rows, and the mean of these differences is mentioned in the line
separating each sub-panel.
What we observe in Table 3.2, for cash flow betas portfolios, is that the mean
3 and also, in their design, to overconfidence, a feature which we are not able to investigate at
this stage
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Table 3.1: Sentiment split vs. Disagreement split, Standard Beta Portfolios
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation standard betas are estimated over
a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The table shows differences in excess returns across
two-way splits of the sample, one in the time series of aggregate market disagreement, and the other in the time series of market sentiment. In Panel A, for
each standard portfolio, we hold constant the level of market disagreement in each sub-panel, and compare average excess returns in periods of high and low
sentiment. In Panel B, the two sub-panels correspond to periods characterized by low and high sentiment, in which we compare the average excess returns in
low and high aggregate disagreement states. The line "Difference" corresponds to the squared difference in excess returns.
Standard Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Panel A : Within market disagreement states, the impact of sentiment variations
Low Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0119
Low Sentiment 0.0893 0.0654 0.0475 0.0389 0.0303 0.0308 0.0246 0.0310 0.0214 0.0085 0.0059 0.0139 0.0078 0.0160 0.0148 0.0245 0.0454 0.0531 0.0581 0.1983
High Sentiment 0.3233 0.1171 0.0905 0.0719 0.0681 0.0815 0.0847 0.1031 0.0982 0.0927 0.1013 0.0951 0.0924 0.0934 0.0816 0.0772 0.0664 0.0627 -0.0515 -0.1240
Difference 0.0548 0.0027 0.0018 0.0011 0.0014 0.0026 0.0036 0.0052 0.0059 0.0071 0.0091 0.0066 0.0072 0.0060 0.0045 0.0028 0.0004 0.0001 0.0120 0.1039
High Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0262
Low Sentiment -0.0546 -0.0084 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0034 0.0090 0.0035 -0.0016 0.0029 0.0040 0.0109 0.0116 0.0184 0.0247 0.0165 0.0252 0.0333 0.0483 0.0362 0.1792
High Sentiment 0.0767 0.0008 0.0038 0.0006 -0.0193 -0.0054 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0227 -0.0218 -0.0063 -0.0309 -0.0202 -0.0361 -0.0565 -0.0560 -0.0607 -0.0890 -0.1356 -0.4751
Difference 0.0172 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.0003 0.0018 0.0015 0.0037 0.0053 0.0066 0.0088 0.0189 0.0295 0.4281
Panel B : Within market sentiment states, the impact of disagreement variations
Low Sentiment – Mean Difference : 0.0017
Low Disagreement 0.0893 0.0654 0.0475 0.0389 0.0303 0.0308 0.0246 0.0310 0.0214 0.0085 0.0059 0.0139 0.0078 0.0160 0.0148 0.0245 0.0454 0.0531 0.0581 0.1983
High Disagreement -0.0546 -0.0084 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0034 0.0090 0.0035 -0.0016 0.0029 0.0040 0.0109 0.0116 0.0184 0.0247 0.0165 0.0252 0.0333 0.0483 0.0362 0.1792
Difference 0.0207 0.0054 0.0021 0.0016 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0011 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0004
High Sentiment – Mean Difference : 0.0206
Low Disagreement 0.3233 0.1171 0.0905 0.0719 0.0681 0.0815 0.0847 0.1031 0.0982 0.0927 0.1013 0.0951 0.0924 0.0934 0.0816 0.0772 0.0664 0.0627 -0.0515 -0.1240
High Disagreement 0.0767 0.0008 0.0038 0.0006 -0.0193 -0.0054 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0227 -0.0218 -0.0063 -0.0309 -0.0202 -0.0361 -0.0565 -0.0560 -0.0607 -0.0890 -0.1356 -0.4751
Difference 0.0608 0.0135 0.0075 0.0051 0.0076 0.0076 0.0076 0.0109 0.0146 0.0131 0.0116 0.0159 0.0127 0.0168 0.0191 0.0177 0.0162 0.0230 0.0071 0.1233
Table 3.2: Stock-Level Dispersion of Forecasts vs. Aggregate Market Disagreement, CF Portfolios
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation cash flow and discount rate betas are
estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The table shows differences in excess
returns across two-way splits of the sample, one in the time series of aggregate market disagreement, and the other in the time series of market sentiment. In
Panel A, for each standard portfolio, we hold constant the level of market disagreement in each sub-panel, and compare average excess returns in periods of
high and low sentiment. In Panel B, the two sub-panels correspond to periods characterized by low and high sentiment, in which we compare the average
excess returns in low and high aggregate disagreement states. The line "Difference" corresponds to the squared difference in excess returns.
CF Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Panel A : Within market disagreement states, the impact of sentiment variations
Low Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0287
Low Sentiment 0.1254 0.0987 0.1353 0.0847 0.1231 0.1007 0.1007 0.0894 0.1134 0.1100 0.1030 0.1137 0.1204 0.1186 0.1477 0.1739 0.1547 0.1877 0.1903 0.2181
High Sentiment 0.0686 0.0266 0.0408 0.0332 0.0220 0.0203 0.0377 0.0246 0.0092 0.0207 0.0013 0.0257 -0.0073 -0.0125 -0.0320 -0.0549 -0.0066 -0.0333 -0.1459 -0.2144
Difference 0.0032 0.0052 0.0089 0.0027 0.0102 0.0065 0.0040 0.0042 0.0109 0.0080 0.0103 0.0077 0.0163 0.0172 0.0323 0.0523 0.0260 0.0488 0.1130 0.1871
High Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0535
Low Sentiment 0.0655 0.0131 0.0439 0.0576 0.0426 0.0562 0.0403 0.0407 0.0504 0.0500 0.0584 0.0700 0.0711 0.0642 0.0659 0.0631 0.0679 0.0556 0.0672 0.0673
High Sentiment -0.1623 -0.0810 -0.1759 -0.1163 -0.1329 -0.1232 -0.1280 -0.1196 -0.1279 -0.1537 -0.1391 -0.1600 -0.1545 -0.1868 -0.1710 -0.2229 -0.2060 -0.2367 -0.2780 -0.2736
Difference 0.0519 0.0089 0.0483 0.0302 0.0308 0.0322 0.0283 0.0257 0.0318 0.0415 0.0390 0.0529 0.0509 0.0630 0.0561 0.0818 0.0750 0.0854 0.1192 0.1162
Panel B : Within market sentiment states, the impact of disagreement variations
Low Sentiment – Mean Difference : 0.0067
Low Disagreement 0.1254 0.0987 0.1353 0.0847 0.1231 0.1007 0.1007 0.0894 0.1134 0.1100 0.1030 0.1137 0.1204 0.1186 0.1477 0.1739 0.1547 0.1877 0.1903 0.2181
High Disagreement 0.0655 0.0131 0.0439 0.0576 0.0426 0.0562 0.0403 0.0407 0.0504 0.0500 0.0584 0.0700 0.0711 0.0642 0.0659 0.0631 0.0679 0.0556 0.0672 0.0673
Difference 0.0036 0.0073 0.0084 0.0007 0.0065 0.0020 0.0036 0.0024 0.0040 0.0036 0.0020 0.0019 0.0024 0.0030 0.0067 0.0123 0.0075 0.0175 0.0152 0.0227
High Sentiment – Mean Difference : 0.0266
Low Disagreement 0.0686 0.0266 0.0408 0.0332 0.0220 0.0203 0.0377 0.0246 0.0092 0.0207 0.0013 0.0257 -0.0073 -0.0125 -0.0320 -0.0549 -0.0066 -0.0333 -0.1459 -0.2144
High Disagreement -0.1623 -0.0810 -0.1759 -0.1163 -0.1329 -0.1232 -0.1280 -0.1196 -0.1279 -0.1537 -0.1391 -0.1600 -0.1545 -0.1868 -0.1710 -0.2229 -0.2060 -0.2367 -0.2780 -0.2736
Difference 0.0533 0.0116 0.0470 0.0224 0.0240 0.0206 0.0275 0.0208 0.0188 0.0304 0.0197 0.0345 0.0217 0.0304 0.0193 0.0282 0.0398 0.0414 0.0175 0.0035
Table 3.3: Stock-Level Dispersion of Forecasts vs. Aggregate Market Disagreement, DR Portfolios
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are
ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation cash flow and discount rate betas are
estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The table shows differences in excess
returns across two-way splits of the sample, one in the time series of aggregate market disagreement, and the other in the time series of market sentiment. In
Panel A, for each standard portfolio, we hold constant the level of market disagreement in each sub-panel, and compare average excess returns in periods of
high and low sentiment. In Panel B, the two sub-panels correspond to periods characterized by low and high sentiment, in which we compare the average
excess returns in low and high aggregate disagreement states. The line "Difference" corresponds to the squared difference in excess returns.
DR Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Panel A : Within market disagreement states, the impact of sentiment variations
Low Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0325
Low Sentiment 0.0511 0.0435 0.0782 0.0824 0.0692 0.0713 0.0933 0.0912 0.1098 0.0976 0.1048 0.1212 0.1203 0.1213 0.1830 0.1701 0.1949 0.2334 0.1987 0.2200
High Sentiment 0.0951 0.0688 0.0688 0.0622 0.0370 0.0356 0.0523 0.0402 0.0251 0.0367 0.0352 0.0095 0.0296 -0.0141 -0.0463 0.0010 -0.0781 -0.1099 -0.1673 -0.2018
Difference 0.0019 0.0006 0.0001 0.0004 0.0010 0.0013 0.0017 0.0026 0.0072 0.0037 0.0048 0.0125 0.0082 0.0183 0.0526 0.0286 0.0745 0.1179 0.1340 0.1779
High Disagreement – Mean Difference : 0.0554
Low Sentiment 0.0406 0.0263 0.0310 0.0465 0.0411 0.0447 0.0530 0.0371 0.0499 0.0677 0.0558 0.0681 0.0593 0.0555 0.0511 0.0844 0.0777 0.0708 0.0718 0.0759
High Sentiment -0.1441 -0.0516 -0.0598 -0.0822 -0.0957 -0.0827 -0.0859 -0.1041 -0.1217 -0.1273 -0.1819 -0.1469 -0.1931 -0.1888 -0.1668 -0.2360 -0.2337 -0.2812 -0.2898 -0.3396
Difference 0.0341 0.0061 0.0082 0.0166 0.0187 0.0162 0.0193 0.0199 0.0294 0.0380 0.0565 0.0462 0.0637 0.0597 0.0475 0.1027 0.0970 0.1239 0.1308 0.1726
Panel B : Within market sentiment states, the impact of disagreement variations
Low Sentiment – Mean Difference : 0.0065
Low Disagreement 0.0511 0.0435 0.0782 0.0824 0.0692 0.0713 0.0933 0.0912 0.1098 0.0976 0.1048 0.1212 0.1203 0.1213 0.1830 0.1701 0.1949 0.2334 0.1987 0.2200
High Disagreement 0.0406 0.0263 0.0310 0.0465 0.0411 0.0447 0.0530 0.0371 0.0499 0.0677 0.0558 0.0681 0.0593 0.0555 0.0511 0.0844 0.0777 0.0708 0.0718 0.0759
Difference 0.0001 0.0003 0.0022 0.0013 0.0008 0.0007 0.0016 0.0029 0.0036 0.0009 0.0024 0.0028 0.0037 0.0043 0.0174 0.0073 0.0137 0.0264 0.0161 0.0208
High Sentiment – Mean Difference : 0.027
Low Disagreement 0.0951 0.0688 0.0688 0.0622 0.0370 0.0356 0.0523 0.0402 0.0251 0.0367 0.0352 0.0095 0.0296 -0.0141 -0.0463 0.0010 -0.0781 -0.1099 -0.1673 -0.2018
High Disagreement -0.1441 -0.0516 -0.0598 -0.0822 -0.0957 -0.0827 -0.0859 -0.1041 -0.1217 -0.1273 -0.1819 -0.1469 -0.1931 -0.1888 -0.1668 -0.2360 -0.2337 -0.2812 -0.2898 -0.3396
Difference 0.0572 0.0145 0.0165 0.0209 0.0176 0.0140 0.0191 0.0208 0.0216 0.0269 0.0471 0.0245 0.0496 0.0305 0.0145 0.0562 0.0242 0.0293 0.0150 0.0190
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differences appear more pronounced for variations in sentiment than for varia-
tions in disagreement. Indeed, the mean squared differences are higher, on av-
erage, in Panel A, which aims to capture the impact of sentiment variations, with
values of 0.0287 and 0.0535, than in Panel B, which aims to capture the impact of
disagreement variations, with values of 0.0067 and 0.0266. However, we see that
the contrast between low and high sentiment is higherwhenwe considering high
disagreement periods where the mean difference of 0.0535 is twice as high as the
one observed in low disagreement periods of 0.0287. When examining the im-
pact of disagreement, we see that it also displays the highest contrast in periods
of high sentiment with a mean squared difference of 0.0266 compared to 0.0067,
an observation which is coherent with what had appeared in Figure 3.2.
The situation is extremely similar in the Table 3.3, which depicts the situation
for discount rate betas, with the numbers for mean squared differences equal
to those obtained for cash flow betas portfolios. Again, what appears is that
variations in sentiment drive higher differences in returns than variations in dis-
agreement, but this effect is larger in periods of high disagreement (0.0554 vs
0.0325). The mean squared differences for variations in disagreement are them-
selves higher in high sentiment periods (0.027 vs 0.0065).
Contrasts aremuch lessmarked in Table 3.1, but of similar nature, and similar
patterns emerge.
3.3.1 Analysis of Risk Premia
In Table 3.4, we report the estimated prices of risk from the cross-sectional re-
gression of the form
Ri −Rf = λ0 + λCF β̂CF + λDRβ̂DR + i (3.1)
for different market states, and with i being each of our 40 portfolios sorted ac-
cording to discount rate and cash flow betas. We should point out that there is no
intuitive link that should be made between these results and Figure 3.2, because
in the latter case, forward excess returns are plotted with respect to the single
dimension of cash flow and discount rate betas, while in this case, for each of
our 40 test assets, we consider both their equal-weighted mean cash flow and
discount rate beta.
What we can gather from Table 3.4, first of all, is that our risk premia are
not significative when considering the whole sample, and the estimation brings
a somewhat low adjusted R-squared. When considering the four different mar-
ket states, however, contrasts appear. Risk premia are significant in all case for
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Table 3.4: Cross-sectional Prices of Risk, Different Market States
Estimated prices of risk from the cross-sectional regression of the form
Ri −Rf = λ0 + λCF β̂CF + λDRβ̂DR + i
with i being one of our 40 cash flow or discount rate beta-sorted portfolios. Figures in round
parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent t−statistics while figures in square parentheses are
partial R2 coefficients. The partial R2 is the squared partial correlation coefficient, where the
partial correlation coefficient measures the correlation between an explanatory variable and the
dependent variable given the other explanatory variables. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
1, 5, and 10% levels respectively.
PANEL A : WHOLE SAMPLE
λCF λDR R2
-0.0072 0.0003 0.1545
(-1.1167) (0.2681)
[0.046] [0.0015]
PANEL B : Disagreement / Sentiment Split
PANEL B-1 : Low Disagreement – Low Sentiment
λCF λDR R2
-0.0286 0.0315*** 0.8846
(-1.3645) (5.8955)
[0.1019] [0.6544]
PANEL B-2 : Low Disagreement – High Sentiment
λCF λDR R2
0.0803** -0.0914*** 0.9333
(2.271) (-9.8335)
[0.1599] [0.7721]
PANEL B-3 : High Disagreement – Low Sentiment
λCF λDR R2
-0.0203** 0.0072*** 0.2166
(-2.3535) (3.2775)
[0.1385] [0.2195]
PANEL B-4 : High Disagreement – High Sentiment
λCF λDR R2
0.0673 -0.1483*** 0.9705
(1.4557) (-12.1679)
[0.0853] [0.8614]
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discount rate betas, and found to be negative in states of high sentiment, and
positive in states of low sentiment. This result appears to be in concordance with
results mentioned before, among those Antoniou et al. (2016). The results are
much less conclusive with respect to premia associated with cash flow betas,
which are found to be significant in mixed states of low and high disagreement
or sentiment.
A feature of note is that the estimation brings higher values for adjuted R-
squared in the case of high sentiment and high disagreement, in accordancewith
evidence we gathered from Figure 3.2.
3.3.2 Robustness check – Decomposition of Returns
In Figure 3.3, we replicate the analysis of Figure 3.2, but this time we do not base
our forward excess returns on portfolios based on cash flow and discount rate
betas, but rather on standard, CAPM betas.
We see that the same patterns that we observed before can be found back for
this analysis, although the contrast is much less clear, and results appear overly
driven by returns obtained on the highest beta-portfolios. In figures which are
not included in the present document, but which are available on request, we
see that when plotting the same curve and ignoring the highest one or two stan-
dard beta portfolios, we are not able to observe the dynamics we obtained when
decomposing standard betas in cash flow and discount rate betas.
3.3.3 Robustness Check – No disagreement split
Finally, as a last robustness check, we replicate the graphs we obtained in Fig-
ure 3.2, but this time we only distinguish between forward excess returns in
month belonging to the lowest and highest quartiles of the sentiment distribu-
tion. We obtain results consistent with Antoniou et al. (2016) among others, who
find that the security market line is negative in periods of high sentiment. For
time horizons of 3 months and higher, the security market line appears to dis-
play a positive slope in low sentiment months, and a decisively negative slope in
months of high sentiment. This also agrees with Barone-Adesi et al. (2013).
We also see, however, that ignoring the influence of disagreement at this anal-
ysis prevents us from observing some key elements that we had examined in Fig-
ure 3.2, in which we saw that a positive slope in the security market line is only
observed in months of both low sentiment and low disagreement, and that the
returns are much lower, much more quickly, in months of high sentiment and
high disagreement.
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Returns, Betas, Sentiment, and Disagreement – No decomposition of returns
Figure 3.3: Returns, Betas, Sentiment, and Disagreement – No decomposition of returns
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks (price < $5). At the be-
ginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at
the end of the previous month. Preformation Standard betas are estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The
ranked stocks are assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The graph plots the average excess returns over a period
of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months for months in the bottom and top quartiles of aggregate disagreement and sentiment. Disagree-
ment: Each month, we calculate for each stock the standard deviation of analyst forecasts for the EPS, our measure of
stock-level disagreement. We use portfolio post-ranking betas to weight each individual stock’s dispersion of forecasts
to obtain a monthly, aggregate disagreement measure. Sentiment: We use the sentiment time series proposed by Baker
and Wurgler (2006). Note: Curves and shaded areas are smoothing splines provided to aid with series identification and
pattern recognition, and should not be interpreted as carrying information with regards to level of statistical significance.
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Returns, Betas, and Sentiment
Figure 3.4: Returns, Betas, and Sentiment
Sample period: 1/1990 to 12/2015. Stocks in the Capital IQ database, excluding penny stocks
(price < $5). At the beginning of each calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on
the basis of the ratio of their estimated beta at the end of the previous month. Preformation
Standard betas are estimated over a period not shorter than 30 weeks. The ranked stocks are
assigned to 1 of 20 equal-weighted portfolios. The graph plots the average excess returns over a
period of 1, 3, 6 and 12months formonths in the bottom and top quartiles of aggregate sentiment.
Sentiment: We use the sentiment time series proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006).
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we used the two prisms of investor sentiment and market dis-
agreement to examine the return dynamics of stocks and decomposed betas.
Our key findings are the following. (1) When we look at disagreement, as we
did in Chapter 2, we are not merely looking at another facet of sentiment. We
have shown that while our results are consistent with existing literature when
we consider only the impact of sentiment, we are also able to disentangle a sepa-
rate impact of disagreement in this regard. (2) Our results suggest that there is an
interaction between sentiment and disagreement. The effect of disagreement is
magnified in periods of high sentiment. A traditional, upward-sloping security
market line is only observed in periods of low disagreement and low sentiment,
while the inversion of this relationship is the most pronounced, in accordance
with extant literature, in periods of not only comparatively high sentiment, but
also high disagreement. (3) Being able to consider the separate impact on cash
flow and discount rate betas allows us not only to better discern the interactions
between disagreement and sentiment, but also brings to light the added impor-
tance of discount rate betas in the situations in which things are most dire: when
investors agree and seem confident.
The existing literature was justified to emphasize the role of sentiment, but
by neglecting its important interplay with disagreement when examining the
dynamics of risk and returns, most forgot that, in this matter as in others, it takes
two to tango.
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Chapter 4
Cracks in the Crystal Ball
Foreign exchange rate exposure when
forecasters disagree 1
4.1 Introduction
Foreign exchange rate volatility and its impact on firms’ operations is a matter
of crucial interest to managers, investors and public authorities. However, al-
though it is clear from a theoretical perspective that exchange rates affect both
firms’ future cash flows and their cost of capital, most attempts to empirically
assess the impact of currency movements on firm value have met with mixed
results (Jorion, 1990; He and Ng, 1998; Griffin and Stulz, 2001). The way firms’
exposure should be measured has thus grown over the years to a central debate.
While a whole strand of the literature investigates the inclusion of more sophis-
ticated definitions of firm-specific (Bartram et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2013) or
market-wide (Chaieb and Mazzotta, 2013) drivers of foreign exchange risk ex-
posure, much progress has been made in the specification of the exchange rate
factor used to measure firms’ currency exposure, too. One of the first studies in
this area by Dominguez and Tesar (2001) demonstrates that since trade-weights
do not correspond with individual firms’ or industries’ trade patterns, the use of
trade-weighted exchange rate indices leads to an underestimation of the impact
of exchange rate shocks. Alternatively, Amihud (1994) raises very early the con-
cern that documented findingsmay be biased because previous research designs
ignore the fact that empirically observed exchange rate variations may have been
partly anticipated. While the new specification of the currency factor byAmihud
(1994) only marginally increases the significance of firms’ exchange rate expo-
1 This chapter is based on the working paper of the same name, co-authored with A. Muller,
W.F.C. Verschoor, and R.C.J. Zwinkels.
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sures, subsequent papers (Gao, 2000; Jongen et al., 2012) have shown that un-
expected currency movements have significantly stronger effects on firm value
than total exchange rate movements.
From a theoretical perspective, measuring foreign exchange risk exposure as
firm values’ sensitivity to unexpected currency fluctuations is consistent with
Adler and Dumas (1984) seminal definition of foreign exchange rate exposure.
Foreign exchange rate exposure should be measured with respect to unexpected
currency fluctuations because expected currency fluctuations have already been
incorporated in estimations of firms’ future cash flows and their cost of capi-
tal. When relaxing the random walk hypothesis of exchange rate movements
and defining foreign exchange rate movement innovations with respect to cur-
rency fluctuations expectations, the question of the most reliable currency fore-
casts needs to be sorted out. While Gao (2000) refers to fundamental macroe-
conomic forces, Jongen et al. (2012) use both derivative market information and
analysts’ forecasts. The latter suggest that unexpected exchange rate movements
measured with respect to analysts’ forecast have the strongest impact on firm
value.
Surprisingly, so far, none of these papers has questioned how differential ac-
curacy levels of exchange rate anticipations used to build the unexpected ex-
change rate factor may impact the estimation of currency risk exposure. None
of these papers makes a distinction between periods where uncertainty on for-
eign exchange ratemarkets is so high thatmarket participants’ express extremely
dispersed opinions about future exchange rate movements and periods where
market participants believe to observe precise and coherent opinions about the
future path of exchange rates. The commentary calls for more research on how
currency forecasts’ statistical properties affect the degree to which these fore-
casts proxy underlying markets’ expectations and the degree to which they are
(or are not) incorporated in market prices. The relationship between a signal’s
presumed informational quality and the way the signal is incorporated in finan-
cial markets has been extensively discussed. When focusing specifically on ex-
change rate forecasts, dispersion is shown to be a key ingredient in explaining
the variation of the valuation impacts of these forecasts (Chen et al., 2005). There-
fore, our paper aims to document, across different levels of exchange rate forecast
dispersion, how stock markets are affected either by unexpected exchange rate
movements or - as traditionally measured - by total exchange rate movements.
Our main goal is to explain when total exchange rate movements may be con-
sidered as poorly performing risk factors to measure firms’ currency exposure
- in other words when the decomposition of these exchange risk factors in ex-
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pected and unexpected currency movements enable us to build more reliable
and economically meaningful measures of the forces that are really influencing
multinationals’ stock returns. The paper complements thus our understanding
of firms’ foreign exchange rate exposure estimation by documenting when and
how differentially characterized anticipations about future exchange rate move-
ments affect our assessment of firms’ currency exposure.
On a large sample of US multinationals that are active in Europe and Japan
this paper makes two important contributions: (1) We disaggregate total ex-
change ratemovements in unanticipated and expected exchange ratemovements;
and investigate in how far unanticipated exchange rate shocks but also revisions
in exchange rate forecasts affect the value of USmultinationals. According to our
empirical findings, this decomposition of the exchange rate factor clearly reveals
that investors are very sensitive to exchange rate forecast revisions (Jongen et al.,
2012) and in line with previous studies that they also react to new exchange rate
movement signals to the extent towhich they differ fromwhat had been expected
in the past. Our results suggest furthermore that the impact of this disaggregated
exchange rate factor is unequivocally stronger than the impact of the most fre-
quently used exchange rate factor previously used in the literature (Jorion, 1990).
(2) In a second stage we conjecture that the degree of heterogeneity among ex-
change rate forecasts (which may be considered as a good proxy for the level of
market disagreement) has a direct negative influence on the market response to
exchange rate forecasts as well as on the degree to which stock movements are
significantly exposed to unanticipated currency shocks. In line with our expec-
tations we observe that in stronger disagreement periods the valuation impact of
unexpected exchange rate movements is lower. In contrast, when market partic-
ipants agree about their forecasts, investors lend more credibility to these fore-
casts and stock prices are more significantly affected by unexpected shocks than
by total exchange rate movements.
A preliminary section of this paper details the motivation of the disaggrega-
tion of the exchange rate factor. In the third section, we describe our data sample
and the research design. Empirical findings are discussed in section four and we
conclude in section five.
4.2 Motivation
In their seminal article, Adler and Dumas (1984) proposed to interpret foreign
exchange risk exposure as the sensitivity of the domestic-currency value of any
physical or financial asset to unanticipated exchange rate movements. In their
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work the exposure of an asset was estimated by regressing its domestic-currency
market return on the contemporaneous unanticipated exchange rate change. As
other variables might covary with exchange rate movements and stock returns,
omitting them might lead to an overestimation of the proportion of variance
attributable to foreign currency movements.define foreign exchange risk expo-
sure as the sensitivity of the domestic-currency value of any physical or financial
asset to unanticipated exchange rate movements. In their work, an asset’s cur-
rency exposure is estimated by regressing its domestic-currency denominated
market return on contemporaneous unanticipated exchange ratemovements. As
other variables might covary with exchange rate movements and stock returns,
omitting them might lead to an overestimation of the proportion of variance at-
tributable to foreign currency movements. Jorion (1990) recommends therefore
an augmented market model, described in Equation (4.1), modelling the asset-
specific exchange rate sensitivity in excess of the total market’s reaction to ex-
change rate movements.
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + γiXt−k,t + εi,t−k,t (4.1)
whereRi,t−k,t designates the total return of asset i in period t−k to t, Rm,t−k,t the
overall stock market return in period t − k to t, βi asset i’s return sensitivity to
market risk,Xt−k,t the exchange rate factor in period t, γi asset i’s exposure to the
exchange rate independent of the effect these currency movements have on the
overall market, and εi,t−k,t denotes the white noise error term.
It should be emphasized that, according to Adler and Dumas (1984)’s semi-
nal definition, foreign exchange risk exposure relates to ‘unanticipated’ changes
in exchange rates. Thus in Equation (4.1) stock returns should not fluctuate in
response to total exchange rate movements but in response to unexpected ex-
change rate movements. The rationalization for this specification is that current
firm values are assumed to have already incorporated currency fluctuations that
were anticipated. Consequently it is only to the extent that exchange rates move
by more (or less) than had been expected that they are likely to generate losses
and gains in economic value. Notice that by relating firm value to innovations
in exchange rate movements rather than to total exchange rate movements, we
allow investors to get accustomed to the news contained in exchange rate fore-
casts and hence to incorporate these forecasts in stock returns. We are moreover
in line with Kandil (2015) who shows that ’unanticipated’ exchange rate fluctu-
ations are the most relevant shocks that either harm or benefit economic activity
and hence impact firm values.
While early foreign exchange risk exposure studies hypothesize that exchange
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rates are unpredictable and that markets perceive them as truly unpredictable
(Jorion, 1990), various approaches have previously been used in the literature to
obtain an estimate of unanticipated exchange rate movements. Amihud (1994)
recommends the use of anAR(1)model to estimate unanticipated currencymove-
ments. After having regressed exchange rate variations on their lagged values,
he estimates Equation (4.1)withXt−k,t being defined as the residuals of theAR(1)
regression – considering the residuals of the AR(1) regression as unanticipated
exchange rate changes. As this procedure only marginally increases the signif-
icance of the results, subsequent studies specify the exchange rate factor to be
relied on in Equation (4.1) to be orthogonal to fundamental variables, see for
instance Gao (2000). More recently, Jongen et al. (2012) compared two alterna-
tive ways to build unanticipated movements: using forwards, on the one hand,
and using survey information from experts’ forecasts, on the other. They con-
clude that the value-relevance of unanticipated exchange rate movement based
on survey-based expectations is the strongest. It should be stressed that the im-
plicit assumption of these studies is that all the information pertaining to these
exchange rate expectations is instantaneously and fully incorporated in firms’
equity valuation - whatever the statistical properties, the accuracy or reliability
of these forecasts. This very strong hypothesis has never been put to the test so
far unlike what has been done in other research areas (see for instance Schmeling
and Schrimpf, 2011).
Unlike previous studies comparing the value-relevance of total exchange rate
movements with the value-impact of unanticipated exchange rate shocks, our
objective is to design the most meaningful and relevant exchange rate factor to
estimate firms’ currency exposure based on the degree to which the informa-
tion contained in foreign exchange forecasts is incorporated in the stock valu-
ation. Dispersion is inevitably a key ingredient in explaining the variation in
markets’ responses to these forecasts (Chen et al., 2005). In our research design
analyst forecast dispersion proxies the precision of underlying market expecta-
tions and, more specifically, the precision of available information to market par-
ticipants at the moment when the forecasts are disclosed. Given that markets
may be more reluctant or may need more time to incorporate the information
conveyed through ambiguous or noisy signals compared to the information con-
veyed through less ambiguous signals, we conjecture that the higher the disper-
sion, the lower the perceived informational content of disclosed exchange rate
expectations and hence the lower their value-relevance for stock markets (Byard
and Shaw, 2003) 2. Across different regimes of disagreement probability, we in-
2 Our intuition is similar to some extent to Doukas et al. (2006) who, in the context of earnings
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vestigate thus how the information contained in exchange rate expectations are
differentially incorporated in market prices – and hence how it affects the in-
formational quality of our exchange rate factor candidates. While unanticipated
exchange ratemovements has appeared so far to be an economically sounder and
more reliable exchange rate factor to measure firms’ currency exposure (Jongen
et al., 2012; Kandil, 2015), we need to assess the value-relevance of unexpected
vs. total exchange rate movements across differential levels of disagreement be-
tween forecasters.
The empirical investigation is based on the Consensus Economics exchange
rate forecasts survey, a highly recognized economic forecast database that iswidely
disseminated among market participants as well as highly debated in the finan-
cial press. We explore to which extent stock prices are exposed to total exchange
rate movements - as traditionally measured - and compare this exposure to the
valuation impact of revisions in exchange rate forecasts and of unanticipated cur-
rency shocks. Unlike previous studies, our main goal is to explain when total
exchange rate movements may be considered as poorly performing risk factors
to measure firms’ currency exposure - in other words when the decomposition
of these exchange risk factors in expected and unexpected currency movements
enable us to build more reliable and economically more meaningful measures
of the forces that are really driving multinationals’ stock returns. To accurately
assess how investors incorporate publicly disseminated exchange rate forecasts
in the stock price valuation process, we analyze the impact of these forecasts
and their corresponding unanticipated currency shocks on multinationals’ stock
price movements both whenmarket participants agree about these forecasts and
when their expectations are widely dispersed.
Section 4.2 illustrates the framework we use throughout this paper.
At time t, all the information related to the forecasts formulated at time t− k
have already been fully reflected in the price Pt. Hence, what really should influ-
ence the price at the point in time is the unanticipated exchange rate movement
(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t), i.e.. the difference between the return that was forecast at time
t − k for time t, designated by Xet−k,t, and the actual return at time t. This is
the reasoning assumed by the literature (Adler and Dumas, 1984; Amihud, 1994;
Jongen et al., 2012).
In line with the literature (Frankel and Lee, 1998; Gleason and Lee, 2003), we
explore as well the degree to which market prices reflect the information in ana-
lysts’ forecasts. More specifically we investigate to what extent investors respond
forecasts, modulate the signal content of the forecasts according to its dispersion (at the stock-
level) and its sign.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the price forming process
efficiently to the informational signals contained in forecasts communicated at
time t, hence pertaining to time t + k – i.e. to what extent extent they incorpo-
rate this information in stock prices at time t. To the extent that forecasts reveal
changingmarket opinions regarding the future evolution of exchange rates, their
informational content is assumed to be shared by market participants when it is
officially disclosed. It could of course also be the case that the information em-
bedded in the forecast might be somewhat leaked before the official disclosure
date. As a consequence, we measure the price impact of this time-variation in
market opinions that is expected to culminate in the disclosure at time t of the
next period forecast pertaining to time t+ k.
4.3 Research Design and Sample description
4.3.1 Extension of the model
To put our research questions to the test, we extend the traditional regression
approach of Jorion (1990) and estimate herewith the stock value relevance of re-
visions in expected exchange rate movements as well as unanticipated currency
shocks:
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + γi1(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) + γi2Xet,t+k + εi,t−k,t (4.2)
where γi1 designates the sensitivity to unanticipatedmovements in the exchange
rates, and γi2 the exposure to the next period forecasted return. Both measures
rely on expert forecasts, and their perception by market participants. Unantici-
pated movements are the difference between the forecast communicated at time
t − k and the realized exchange rate movement observed at timet. The next pe-
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riod forecasted currency return is the expected exchange rate movements over
the next period according to the latest exchange rate forecast.
We conjecture that the significance andmagnitude of both exposures depend
on the perceived relevance of the signal provided by exchange rate forecasts.
Following Byard and Shaw (2003) we use the observed heterogeneity across ex-
change rate anticipations to proxy the relevance of the signal. The underlying
rationale is straightforward: when forecasters agree about the future path of cur-
rency values, exchange rate expectation data is expected to be perceived as more
meaningful and trustworthy by investors. Conversely, when analysts disagree,
the signal is most probably regarded as more ambiguous and questionable by
market participants. Consequently currency expectations whose dispersion is
higher are expected to affect stock markets less strongly and less significantly.3
To build a time-varying estimate of the probability that survey analysts are in
a state of agreement, the following model is used:
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t
+ Prob(St = S1)γi1(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) + Prob(St = S1)γi2Xet,t+k
+ Prob(St = S2)γi3(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) + Prob(St = S2)γi4Xet,t+k
+ εi,t−k,t (4.3)
where S is the discrete, unobserved, state variable which takes value 1 in a state
we identify as being a state of agreement, and 2 otherwise, i.e. a state of disagree-
ment.
4.3.2 U.S. multinational firms
Our sample is composed ofU.S.multinational firmswith real operations in Japan
and Europe.4 Due to their real foreign trade and production activities, it can be
expected thatmultinational companies are affected by exchange ratemovements.
With the help of the Uniworld database of US Multinational Enterprises in For-
eign Countries, we have identified 2026 such companies over the period 1999-
2011. Of these, we have kept those for which daily stock price information was
3 Another possible interpretation is that different investors trust different forecasters, and in
situations of disagreement, accordingly elaborate different personal expectations regarding
the future movements of the exchange rates.
4 Our focus on this sub-sample of US multinationals is motivated by the fact that Japan and
Europe belong to the most important import and export partners of US multinationals, and
simultaneously the USD/EUR and the USD/JPY to the most widely and frequently reported
and debated exchange rates in financial media.
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available from the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database, for a period of at least 60 months. This process leaves us with
a sample of 1675 companies.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the selected multinationals’ geographical dis-
persion.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
# Europe Japan
Europe 1148 - 51.05%
Japan 639 91.71% -
Total Sample 1675 68.54% 38.15%
4.3.3 Exchange risk factors
Every second Monday of each calendar month Consensus Economics of London
publishes results from a survey among up to 150 leading professional market
participants and forecasting agencies for their subjective expectations of a large
number of exchange rates. Examples of panel companies include Morgan Stan-
ley, Oxford Economic Forecasting, Deutsche Bank Research and BNP Paribas.
The forecasts are point forecasts against the U.S. dollar and are available for vari-
ous forecast horizons ranging from 1month to 24 months ahead. We specifically
use the 3 and 12 months ahead expectations.
Although the survey participants have a fewdays time to return their expecta-
tions, we know that the vast majority send their forecasts by e-mail on the Friday
before the publication day (usually second Monday of the month). We consider
this Friday to be the day on which the expectations are formed. On this Friday,
we also obtain spot rates data. All spot series are obtained through Datastream
and have their origin either in Reuters or Barclays Bank International.
We proceed by defining the natural logarithm of the current spot rate on a
particular currency j at time t as sj,t and the natural logarithm of the k-period
ahead consensus expectation formed at time t for time t + k as sej,t,t+k and make
the assumption the expectation corresponds to the unobserved ‘true’ market ob-
servation up to awhite noise random error, so that sej,t,t+k = Et[sj,t+k]+εj,t+k. The
k-period realized change in the exchange rate can hence be decomposed into an
‘anticipated’ (or expected) component and an ‘unanticipated’ (or noise) compo-
nent:
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sj,t+k − sj,t = (sej,t,t+k − sj,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
anticipated
+ (sj,t+k − sej,t,t+k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unanticipated
(4.4)
which corresponds to
Xt−k,t = Xet−k,t + (Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) (4.5)
in our previous notation.
4.3.4 Probability of agreement among experts
First let us define a measure based on the volatility of the forecasts scaled with
respect to the average at time t, as shown in Equation (4.6).
νt,t+k = σt,t+k/µt,t+k (4.6)
An overview of the constructed series is presented in Section 4.3.4, and sum-
mary statistics are available in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Coefficients of variation
To construct a time-varying estimate of the probability of agreement among
the forecasters, we use a simple form of regime change model based on a two-
state Markov chain, as described in Hamilton (1994).
Our model then takes the following form:
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. J-B Prob Obs
Total Return Europe -0.09% 0.01% -9.06% 7.11% 3.21% -0.21 2.62 2.10 0.2864 155
Japan -0.23% -0.05% -7.30% 7.93% 3.04% -0.04 2.72 0.55 0.5000 155
Forecasted Returns Europe -0.25% -0.26% -3.82% 4.40% 1.53% 0.12 2.78 0.71 0.5000 156
Japan -0.07% -0.35% -4.14% 4.44% 1.74% 0.21 2.55 2.51 0.2196 156
Unexpected Returns Europe 0.16% 0.21% -9.50% 9.22% 3.77% 0.00 2.59 1.09 0.5000 155
Japan -0.17% -0.24% -8.03% 7.92% 3.28% -0.01 2.51 1.54 0.3990 155
Coefficient of variation Europe 3.63% 3.03% 1.54% 8.36% 1.59% 0.91 2.86 21.44 0.0024 156
Japan 2.59% 2.43% 1.48% 5.84% 0.78% 1.52 6.01 119.13 0.0010 156
3-Month forecast horizon
Total Return Europe -0.37% -0.79% -10.25% 16.38% 5.58% 0.49 2.84 6.18 0.0413 153
Japan -0.79% -0.33% -14.54% 11.47% 4.87% -0.07 2.91 0.19 0.5000 153
Forecasted Returns Europe -0.74% -0.73% -6.98% 5.74% 2.32% -0.12 3.08 0.44 0.5000 156
Japan -0.07% -0.27% -5.68% 6.48% 2.64% 0.00 2.44 2.02 0.3016 156
Unexpected Returns Europe 0.44% -0.26% -14.52% 17.50% 6.33% 0.33 2.49 4.45 0.0783 153
Japan -0.73% -0.43% -16.08% 12.40% 5.74% -0.12 2.62 1.28 0.4712 153
Coefficient of variation Europe 5.16% 4.56% 2.38% 10.17% 1.91% 0.73 2.45 15.73 0.0054 156
Japan 3.82% 3.59% 2.38% 6.99% 0.94% 1.13 4.19 42.64 0.0010 156
12-month forecast horizon
Total Return Europe -2.16% -3.71% -23.11% 20.05% 10.83% 0.19 2.06 6.15 0.0417 144
Japan -2.93% -4.45% -19.32% 16.22% 8.59% 0.38 2.27 6.67 0.0356 144
Forecasted Returns Europe -2.13% -1.82% -16.32% 9.06% 5.02% -0.41 3.10 4.33 0.0830 156
Japan -0.25% -0.08% -10.59% 9.92% 5.42% -0.02 2.19 4.27 0.0850 156
Unexpected Returns Europe 0.22% -1.93% -19.97% 28.32% 11.72% 0.38 2.41 5.60 0.0497 144
Japan -2.18% -4.52% -20.68% 19.12% 11.36% 0.29 1.78 10.90 0.0129 144
Coefficient of variation Europe 8.41% 8.08% 3.67% 13.86% 2.41% 0.31 2.33 5.51 0.0517 156
Japan 6.42% 6.16% 4.19% 10.26% 1.17% 0.94 3.78 26.80 0.0013 156
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νt,t+k = µ1 + εt for State 1 (4.7)
νt,t+k = µ2 + εt for State 2 (4.8)
where:
εt ∼ (0, σ21) for State 1 (4.9)
εt ∼ (0, σ22) for State 2 (4.10)
The model is estimated using Maximum Likelihood.5 As an example, Fig-
ure 4.3 shows the coefficient of variation in the case of the 3-month horizon for
Europe. By visually comparing this graph with Section 4.3.4, we identify the
first state as being a state of agreement, i.e. with comparatively lower values for
the coefficient of variation (measuring the dispersion in forecasts). Figure 4.3 re-
veals that the state of agreement is followed by a period of roughly 20 months of
probable disagreement, then by a slightly shorter period of probable agreement.
The series end with a highly probable disagreement period. The interpretation
is coherent with observed patterns in Section 4.3.4.
Figure 4.3: Example of regime switching for the 3-month EUR coefficient of variation
5 Themaximization of the log-likelihood function is carried out with the help of the Expectation
Maximization (EM) Algorithm. We use MATLAB for all computations, and more specifically
in this case, a modified version of the package created by Perlin (2012)
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Table 4.3 shows the impact of total exchange rate variations versus disaggregated
variations. To establish a benchmark, the upper part of the table uses the tradi-
tional currency risk exposure specification using a market risk factor based on
the CRSP value weighted market returns series (which we will refer to as mar-
ket returns from now on) and a currency risk factor based on the total realized
exchange rate return observed on the previous period. For each risk factor the
proportion of firms that is statistically significantly exposed to the risk factor (at
the chosen level of α = 0.05) is provided. It should be emphasized that reported
regressions investigate US multinational firms’ currency exposures to the euro
and to the Japanese yen.6
Firms documenting significant currency exposure range from 9.6% to 66.7%
of their corresponding sample in contrastwith previous results. Jorion (1990), for
instance, finds that only 5% of 287 U.S. multinational corporations exhibit signif-
icant exchange risk exposure, whereas Choi and Prasad (1995) find that 15% of
409 multinationals are significantly exposed. Bartram and Bodnar (2012), who
study all non-financial firms and thus do not restrict their analysis to multina-
tional firms, obtain a fraction of significant coefficients of 11.4% across 37 coun-
tries. At this stage, possible explanations for our results include the fact that
unlike most other studies, we do not rely on a basket of currencies to build our
foreign exchange factors. Our database allows us to assess which multinationals
have foreign operations in which countries. This enables us on the one hand to
rely on currency factors that are specific to firms’ foreign activities, and, on the
other hand, to restrict our analysis to firms that are more likely to be affected by
movements in these selected currencies. On the top of that we do not exclusively
investigate currency exposure at the 1-month observation frequency, as typically
explored in the literature, but as well at the 3- and 12-month frequency.
The lower part of the table refers to themodel presented in Equation (4.2). We
disaggregate the exposure to realized total currency movements into exposures
to expected and unexpected exchange rate movement components. In accor-
dance with theoretical groundings, the exposure to unexpected currency move-
ments is measured based on (Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t), the difference between the return
forecasted at time t− k for time t, designated byXet−k,t, and the ex post observed
return Xt−k,t at time t. Additionally, we also aim to verify to which extent fore-
casts about future exchange rate movements affect firms’ stock values. Results
examining both components separately reveal that they have significant impacts
6 Each of these regressions is performed using 1-, 3- and 12-month currency forecasts.
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Table 4.3: The impact of total exchange rate variations versus disaggregated variations
The table reports, for k = 1, 3, and 12months, cross-sectional summary statistics of the estimation of the following regres-
sion models. The first is Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + γiXt−k,t + εi,t−k,t, where Ri,t−k,t designates the total return
of asset i over period t−k to t,Rm,t−k,t the overall stock market return in period t−k to t, βi asset i’s return sensitivity
to market risk, Xt−k,t the total return over period t − k to t, γi asset i’s exposure to the exchange rate independent of
the effect these currency movements have on the overall market, and εi,t−k,t denotes the white noise error term. The
second is Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + γi1(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) + γi2Xet,t+k + εi,t−k,t which corresponds to Eq. (4.2)
in the text, where (Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) denotes the unanticipated return over the period t− k to t, andXet,t+k represents
the forecasted return, over the period t to t+ k, based on the forecast communicated at time t.
EUR JP
1m 3m 12m 1m 3m 12m
Constant 5.4 24.5 61.9 5.3 25.7 63.9
Market 97.7 95.0 92.8 98.6 97.5 96.1
Xt−k,t 14.9 31.9 60.6 9.6 26.5 66.7
of which positive 42.9 54.0 50.4 41.0 61.6 57.2
of which negative 57.1 46.0 49.6 59.0 38.4 42.8
Adj R2 28.5 30.5 40.4 30.7 33.1 43.8
Constant 4.8 24.2 61.7 5.7 28.1 66.1
Market 97.8 95.1 93.5 98.6 97.6 96.5
Xet,t+k 8.5 17.2 45.9 10.8 31.7 59.7
of which positive 49.5 36.5 39.8 88.4 86.6 65.8
of which negative 50.5 63.5 60.2 11.6 13.4 34.2
Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t 12.9 28.6 47.9 8.8 39.9 70.5
of which positive 56.1 55.4 53.5 71.4 78.0 61.5
of which negative 43.9 44.6 46.5 28.6 22.0 38.5
of firms with significant FX factor 17.1 39.2 68.4 15.2 52.4 78.8
of which positive 54.8 49.2 47.8 82.0 79.0 61.5
of which negative 45.2 50.8 52.2 18.0 21.0 38.5
Adj R2 28.6 31.0 43.5 30.8 34.4 48.7
Numbers represent the percentage of firms for which the coefficient on the independent variable shows significance at
the α = 0.05 level, except for the Adj R2 line, which shows the average Adjusted R2 obtained for the whole number of
regressions.
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on multinational firm values. Their influence is even complementary as, when
considering both components together, we obtain larger proportions of firms that
are significantly exposed. Increases with respect to previous specification vary
from 2.2% to 25.9% in the case of the 3-month horizon for the Japanese region.
Table 4.5: How disagreement among forecasters affects the impact of Expected
Returns
The table reports, for k = 1, 3, and 12 months, cross-sectional summary statistics of the estimation of the following re-
gression models. The first is
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + γiXet,t+k + εi,t−k,t
where Ri,t−k,t designates the total return of asset i over period t − k to t, Rm,t−k,t the overall stock market return in
period t − k to t, βi asset i’s return sensitivity to market risk, Xet,t+k forecasted return over period tk to t + k, γi asset
i’s exposure to the forecasted return independent of the effect these have on the overall market, and εi,t−k,t denotes the
white noise error term.
The second is
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + Prob(St = S1)γi1Xet,t+k + Prob(St = S2)γi2X
e
t,t+k + εi,t−k,t
where Xet,t+k represents the forecasted return, over the period t to t + k, based on the forecast communicated at time
t, and where S is the discrete, unobserved, state variable which takes value 1 in a state we identify as being a state of
agreement, and 2 otherwise, i.e. a state of disagreement.
EUR JP
1m 3m 12m 1m 3m 12m
Constant 4.6 24.1 60.9 4.9 24.6 59.7
Market 97.7 96.9 93.9 98.6 98.0 96.5
Xet,t+k 9.0 18.7 57.8 10.4 19.3 46.3
Adj R2 28.2 29.9 40.4 30.7 32.7 41.3
Constant 3.8 24.5 60.9 5.0 23.9 60.0
Market 97.6 96.8 94.2 98.6 98.0 96.5
Xet,t+k in agreement regime 4.8 18.5 56.3 10.2 16.5 46.6
Xet,t+k in disagreement regime 8.1 6.4 38.2 8.6 5.5 5.7
of firms with significant expected FX factor 12.5 23.7 73.9 17.7 20.7 49.6
Adj R2 28.2 30.0 42.2 30.8 32.7 41.4
Numbers represent the percentage of firms for which the coefficient on the independent variable shows significance at
the α = 0.05 level, except for the Adj R2 line, which shows the average Adjusted R2 obtained for the whole number of
regressions.
Table 4.5 and Table 4.7 display the empirical findings regarding the impact of
these two complementary currency factors, i.e. forecasts about the future move-
ments in exchange rates and unanticipated currency movements, measured as
the difference between the currency returns forecasted at time t − k for time t
and the actual exchange rate returns observed at time t. In each table we suggest
to investigate the impact on firm value across two distinctive regimes: regime 1
characterized by a low dispersion in these currency forecasts and regime 2 char-
acterized by a high dispersion, hence a strong disagreement between forecasters.
We observe that in both cases, distinguishing between the two regimes pro-
vides a better fit to the return data, as measured by the Adjusted R2. More stock
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Table 4.7: How disagreement among forecasters affects the impact of Unex-
pected Returns
The table reports, for k = 1, 3, and 12 months, cross-sectional summary statistics of the estimation of the following re-
gression models. The first is
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + γi1(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) + εi,t−k,t
where Ri,t−k,t designates the total return of asset i over period t − k to t, Rm,t−k,t the overall stock market return in
period t− k to t, βi asset i’s return sensitivity to market risk, where (Xt−k,t−Xet−k,t) denotes the unanticipated return
over the period t− k to t, and εi,t−k,t denotes the white noise error term.
The second is
Ri,t−k,t = αi+βiRm,t−k,t+Prob(St = S1)γi1(Xt−k,t−Xet−k,t)+Prob(St = S2)γi2(Xt−k,t−Xet−k,t)+εi,t−k,t
where S is the discrete, unobserved, state variable which takes value 1 in a state we identify as being a state of agreement,
and 2 otherwise, i.e. a state of disagreement.
EUR JP
1m 3m 12m 1m 3m 12m
Constant 4.8 27.3 62.8 5.8 25.4 63.6
Market 97.8 95.4 93.4 98.6 97.8 96.2
Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t 14.0 29.4 58.4 8.3 32.2 65.5
Adj R2 28.4 30.4 40.5 30.6 33.3 43.9
Constant 4.5 27.4 63.5 6.0 25.6 63.0
Market 97.6 95.7 93.7 98.6 97.6 96.4
Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t in agreement regime 9.5 29.0 56.9 8.9 32.3 65.0
Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t in disagreement regime 9.5 15.1 20.9 9.6 16.3 9.4
of firms with significant unexpected FX factor 18.4 39.6 66.5 17.4 42.9 69.4
Adj R2 28.5 30.9 41.3 30.8 33.8 44.1
Numbers represent the percentage of firms for which the coefficient on the independent variable shows significance at
the α = 0.05 level, except for the Adj R2 line, which shows the average Adjusted R2 obtained for the whole number of
regressions.
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values are found to be significantly exposed to forecasted (Table 4.5)and unantic-
ipated (Table 4.7) exchange rate movements when we take into account the dis-
crimination between agreement and disagreement regimes. Most importantly,
in both tables, empirical findings reveal that stock values react deferentially to
these exchange risk factors in agreement vs. disagreement regimes. Both dis-
aggregated exchange risk factor components turn out to be substantially more
value-relevant in agreement regimes than in disagreement regimes. When com-
paring both regimes, we observe an average increase of 20.6% of significantly
exposed firm values to exchange rate forecasts in agreement vs. disagreement
regimes, and an average increase of 30.4% of significantly exposed firm values to
unanticipated exchange rate fluctuations.7 These empirical results support the
intuition that forecasts are perceived by investors as carrying more information
when experts agree about the future path of exchange rates, than when forecast-
ers seem unable to agree on the future evolution of currencies.
Table 4.9 shows our results for the completemodel presented in Equation (4.3).
To allow for an easier comparison, we reproduce the upper part of Table 4.3 in
the upper part of Table 4.9.
First of all we see that the complete model is the one best able to explain
the data, as the Adjusted R2 obtained are the largest in this setting, with values
ranging from 28.7% for the 1-month horizon in Europe to 49.1% for the 12-month
horizon in Japan. The improvement is noticeable on amore standard framework,
such as the one presented in the top of table, which corresponds to the traditional
setting used in the literature to measure firms’ currency exposures.
We also see additional support for our previously documented finding that
investors pay more attention to forecasts when experts are in agreement, with
an average of 30.6%more firms being significantly exposed to disaggregated for-
eign exchange factors in the agreement regime. As theory and intuition would
predict, widely diverging forecasts are considered less reliable by investors. The
disaggregation of exchange rates based onwidely diverging forecasts doesn’t cor-
respond hence to investors’ information perception of exchange rate risk. When
forecasters have strongly contradictory opinions about the future, investors don’t
rely on the signal forecasters send to the market but rely on market observed ex-
change ratemovements. This is illustrated for instance by the drop from 66.7% of
significantly exposed firms to the total Japanese exchange rate risk factor to 18.5%
of significantly exposed firms to the forecast-based disaggregated exchange risk
factor in disagreement regime for the 12-month horizon in Japan. In contrast,
when forecasters share commonopinions about future exchange ratemovements,
7 With an exception for the European region at the 1-month horizon.
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Table 4.9: Complete model with agreement regimes
The table reports, for k = 1, 3, and 12 months, cross-sectional summary statistics of the estimation of the following re-
gression models. The first is
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + γiXt−k,t + εi,t−k,t
where Ri,t−k,t designates the total return of asset i over period t − k to t, Rm,t−k,t the overall stock market return in
period t − k to t, βi asset i’s return sensitivity to market risk, Xt−k,t the total return over period t − k to t, γi asset
i’s exposure to the exchange rate independent of the effect these currency movements have on the overall market, and
εi,t−k,t denotes the white noise error term.
The second is
Ri,t−k,t = αi + βiRm,t−k,t + Prob(St = S1)γi1(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) + Prob(St = S1)γi2Xet,t+k
+Prob(St = S2)γi3(Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t) + Prob(St = S2)γi4Xet,t+k + εi,t−k,t
which corresponds to Eq. (4.3) in the text, where S is the discrete, unobserved, state variable which takes value 1 in a
state we identify as being a state of agreement, and 2 otherwise, i.e. a state of disagreement.
EUR JP
1m 3m 12m 1m 3m 12m
Constant 5.4 24.5 61.9 5.3 25.7 63.9
Market 97.7 95.0 92.8 98.6 97.5 96.1
Xt−k,t 14.9 31.9 60.6 9.6 26.5 66.7
of which positive 42.9 54.0 50.4 41.0 61.6 57.2
of which negative 57.1 46.0 49.6 59.0 38.4 42.8
Adj R2 28.5 30.5 40.4 30.7 33.1 43.8
Constant 4.0 24.9 61.5 5.3 27.6 64.7
Market 96.9 95.6 93.7 98.4 97.6 96.4
Xet,t+k in agreement regime 7.5 16.5 46.2 11.1 29.7 59.8
of which positive 22.1 38.6 42.2 85.9 86.2 65.9
of which negative 77.9 61.4 57.8 14.1 13.8 34.1
Xet,t+k in disagreement regime 7.9 6.6 39.6 3.8 6.0 8.9
of which positive 73.3 55.3 33.6 33.3 73.7 57.9
of which negative 26.7 44.7 66.4 66.7 26.3 42.1
Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t in agreement regime 12.5 28.8 47.4 10.2 40.2 70.3
of which positive 18.9 59.6 51.3 73.8 78.5 61.2
of which negative 81.1 40.4 48.7 26.2 21.5 38.8
Xt−k,t −Xet−k,t in disagreement regime 9.6 15.4 21.9 4.2 17.7 11.1
of which positive 79.1 15.9 36.0 33.3 16.8 54.9
of which negative 20.9 84.1 64.0 66.7 83.2 45.1
of firms with significant factor in agreement regime 14.5 38.7 67.8 16.2 51.6 79.0
of which positive 20.5 51.0 48.4 80.1 80.1 61.2
of which negative 79.5 49.0 51.6 19.9 19.9 38.8
of firms with significant factor in disagreement regime 13.4 20.9 53.2 4.4 22.3 18.5
of which positive 74.2 37.4 38.0 35.7 40.8 59.7
of which negative 25.8 62.6 62.0 64.3 59.2 40.3
of firms with significant FX factor 26.3 51.4 85.2 19.0 62.2 82.7
of which positive 47.8 45.2 44.0 55.6 61.4 58.1
of which negative 52.2 54.8 56.0 44.4 38.6 41.9
Adj R2 28.7 31.6 46.0 30.9 35.0 49.1
Numbers represent the percentage of firms for which the coefficient on the independent variable shows significance at
the α = 0.05 level, except for the Adj R2 line, which shows the average Adjusted R2 obtained for the whole number of
regressions.
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the most value-relevant informational signals affecting companies’ stock values
are currency forecasts and the extent to which observed market exchange rate
movements diverge from previously disclosed forecasts. In these regimes char-
acterized by convergent opinions about future exchange rate movements, more
than 50% (80%) of US multinationals firms are significantly affected by our dis-
aggregated exchange risk factors when considering 3 and 12-month forecasts.
The comparison between empirical findings obtained using the traditional ap-
proach to estimate firms’ currency exposure with these results using the disag-
gregated exchange risk factor approach (see columns 2, 3, 5 and 6) reveals that
when forecasters have convergent views about the future path of exchange rates,
more firms are significantly exposed to these forecasts and the degree to which
they diverge from ex post observed exchange rate fluctuations. The proportion
of firms that is documented significantly sensitive to currency movements us-
ing our modified approach is, hence, under these circumstances, much higher
than the percentage of firms considered as significantly exposed to exchange rate
movements using the traditional exchange risk factor. This emphasizes the im-
portance of including the investigation of firms’ sensitivity to exchange rate fore-
casts and to unanticipated exchange rate movements as well as the importance of
discriminating between periods in which investors lend more credit to forecasts
from situations in which they do less. Our results offer hereby a more informed
and nuanced understanding of the role of exchange rate forecasts when estimat-
ing firms’ exposure to currency movements.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
We consider the exposure of U.S. multinationals to exchange rate movements.
While recognizing the importance of using unanticipated movements to explain
stock returns, we show that the use of the information contained in next period
forecasts proves fruitful as well. Most importantly, we construct a time-varying
measure of the probability that forecasters are in a situation of agreement vs.
disagreement – a measure that enables us to shed new, more nuanced, light on
the role of currency forecasts in the estimation of firms’ currency exposures. Our
agreement vs. disagreement regimes allow us to test whether markets respond
deferentially to experts’ opinions according to the level of dispersion among ex-
perts’ forecasts. While our empirical findings stress once more that being able to
identify the regions in which each multinational has foreign operations - allow-
ing us to measure firms’ currency exposure to specific currencies rather than a
weighted basket, increases the precision and significance of exposure estimates,
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the two main findings of this paper are: (1) Taking into account exchange rate
forecasts together with unanticipated movements lead to statistically stronger
and more meaningful currency exposure estimates. (2) The value-relevance of
exchange rate risk factors constructed based on forecast information varies with
the degree of agreement among panel experts. Our findings reveal that when
forecasters’ opinions converge, the investigation of firm values’ sensitivity to ex-
change rate forecasts and to unanticipated currency movements generates eco-
nomically relevant and intuitive information regarding firms’ currency expo-
sures. They reveal furthermore the importance of discriminating between peri-
ods in which forecasters share common views about future exchange rate move-
ments from periods in which opinions diverge: results show that when cracks
appear in forecasters’ crystal balls, investors feel less inclined to lend credence
to their predictions – and hence to take them into account in their perception of
firms’ currency exposures.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Conclusive remarks
The conceptual beauty of theoretical models does not always meet reality in the
nicest way. Some of the most famous predictions in finance have also been the
hardest to reconcile with empirical investigations. The CAPM of Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965) is one of most widely used benchmarks in finance, still exten-
sively used by finance practitioners in professional environments to this day, and
at the same time, it is the object of one of the longest-lasting debate in finance.
In a world of beautiful people in beautiful markets, i.e., rational agents, who
update their beliefs according to Bayes’ law, and have preferences characterized
by intertemporal utility maximization, who trade in complete, liquid, efficient
and competitive markets, one of the predictions of the CAPM is that the beta of
a stock should give us all the information we need about its risk, and accord-
ingly, its expected return. There have been many proposed refinements to what
might some consider its excessively simple design, but none have gained such
prominence as to eclipse the influence of the CAPM.
In time, it is unavoidable that empirical investigations will bring to light el-
ements conflicting with the expectations set by the classical framework. In this
thesis, we respectfully think we have found an interesting pattern that conflicts
with theoretical expectations about the connection betweenmeasures of risk and
return on the one hand, andmarket-widemeasures of disagreement on the other.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we have shown how disagreement induces an effect
on the average excess returns of portfolios constructed on the basis of cash flow
and discount rate betas.
While we do not pretend to be able to discern among all possible explana-
tions for this phenomenon, we argue that this seems to be a mispricing consis-
tent with Miller (1977)’s conjecture that, in a market in which there is little to
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no short-selling, the price signal is carried by the investors who hold the highest
valuation of the asset. We have observed that stock-level disagreement increases
with our measures of risk, and decidedly so in periods of higher disagreement.
With divergence of opinion being then higher for those assets, their price will
be overvalued, and their returns substantially lower. This is exactly what we ob-
serve in our data. Our results also agree with previous results from Baker et al.
(2011); Frazzini and Pedersen (2014); Antoniou et al. (2016).
We remain aware, as Baker and Wurgler (2006), of the fact that these pat-
terns might actually not be mispricings at all, and merely reflect compensation
for systematic risk, which our analysis was not able to discover. There are also
other competing interpretations. Dispersion of forecasts could denote uncer-
tainty about future outcomes. Nevertheless, we think our results do not support
the interpretation of disagreement being a priced risk factor, even though we ac-
knowledge that firmly establishing this requires amethodological frameworkwe
have not implemented.
There might also be other reasons for observing lower returns, for portfolios
with high cash flow and discount rate beta, in high periods of disagreement.
What we observe may simply be a manifestation of another market-wide mood
indicator, sentiment. In Chapter 3, we have proposed to put that hypothesis un-
der scrutiny. Our results suggest that, while sentiment does play a decisive role
in affecting the risk return relationships of our portfolios, this effect is particu-
larly strong in periods of high disagreement. Far from being sidelined by the
level of market sentiment, our market-wide measure of disagreement actually
appears to work best in tandem with it. Moreover, it appears that leveraging the
information lying in our market-wide disagreement measure provides key addi-
tional insights, a result which appears consistent with Stambaugh et al. (2012),
who find that "If the primary form of mispricing is overpricing, then mispricing
should be more prevalent when sentiment is high".
Another possibility would be that it is not disagreement that influences the
risk return relationship, and that the real cause is due to another effect we have
missed. While it is impossible to completely rule out this possibility, we gain
some assurance from the robustness checks we have performed in Section 2.3.4,
which show our results holding their ground when we use different time series
of disagreement.
Finally, we bring our attention to foreign exchange exposure in Chapter 4.
That multinational companies should be exposed to foreign exchange risk is a
firmly grounded theory in the literature (Shapiro, 1975; Dumas, 1978; Hodder,
1982; Levi, 1994; Bodnar et al., 2002), but this exposure has proven to be elusive
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in the data (Jorion, 1990; He and Ng, 1998; Griffin and Stulz, 2001). Our results
tend to confirm that, in agreement with Adler and Dumas (1984), it matters to
consider unexpected returns to capture exchange risk exposure. They also show
that being able tomodulate the signal on the basis of the level of dispersion in the
forecasts, and thus discriminate between periods when forecasters share com-
mon views about future movements from periods when their opinions diverge,
is essential to capture the exposure of firms to foreign exchange risk.
Twomain insights appear in our investigation. (i) Disagreement, when incor-
porated in the analysis as amarket-wide indicator, allows us to better understand
the relationship between risk and returns. This additional information is com-
plementary to the one provided by the indicator of sentiment, already identified
in the extant literature. (ii) Being able to disentangle a stock’s beta into its cash
flow and discount rate betas enables us to to capture effects that are not apparent
otherwise.
5.2 Future research
5.2.1 Methodological framework to investigate economic signif-
icance
At this stage, our analysis suffers from being unable to provide some decisive
information about the economical significance of the observed phenomenons.
We think our findings point the way to relevant research areas, in which other
formal methodological tools can be employed. In Buraschi et al. (2014a), for in-
stance, the authors use a three-step treatment of their disagreement measure: in
a first step, they follow Ang et al. (2006) and construct factor mimicking portfo-
lios for their untraded disagreement proxy. They then regress the time series of
portfolio returns on the factor mimicking portfolio returns, and the two Fama-
French factors. In a last step they regress the average excess return on the vector
of estimated factor exposures. Their procedure allows them to draw conclusions
as to the market price of their disagreement proxy.
5.2.2 Assessing the strength of prevailing limits to arbitrage
Part of our analysis relies on limits to arbitrage binding the behavior of certain
investors. Therefore, our work would benefit from leveraging approach to objec-
tively assess the prevailing strength of limits to arbitrage. For instance, Chen et al.
(2002) use breadth of ownership to signal a tightness in short-sale constraints.
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5.2.3 Refinement of the disagreement measure
Quite simply, our analysis would benefit greatly from being replicated and en-
hancedusing the analysts forecasts information from the reference I/B/E/Sdatabase.
First of all, it would allow us to be much more confident that our results are
not due to some particularities of our database. Given that I/B/E/S has been
extensively used by finance practitioners, certain database-specific best practices
in terms of data manipulation have become necessary standards for published
research.
It presents some specificities that would allow to leverage possible improve-
ments in the construction of disagreement measures. Lahiri and Sheng (2010),
for instance, propose to use the quasi-standard deviation or inter-quartile range
instead of the standard deviation of forecasts, which is particularly susceptible
to the presence of outliers in the sample. Doing so requires having access to
individual point estimates of the forecasts, something that was technically not
possible using the Capital IQ database.
Our analysis would greatly benefit from being able to leverage longer time-
series in the definition of our market-wide disagreement measure. Doing so
would allow us to be more confident that our results are not period-specific.
Another added benefit from being able to widen the period under considera-
tion lies in the fact that the decomposition of returnsmethodology, whichwe use
to obtain our cash flow and discount rate betas, also tends to benefit from being
applied to larger time intervals. In Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), the author
compare their results for two time periods of more than 30 years: 1929-1963 and
1963-2001. In more recent empirical implementations, the time frame are larger
than 30 years (Botshekan et al., 2012; Garrett and Priestley, 2012).
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